CTF Reverse Engineering
ctf-reverse
Reverse engineering techniques for CTF challenges. Use when analyzing binaries, game clients, obfuscated code, or esoteric languages.
SKILL.md
Full skill instructions
CTF Reverse Engineering
Quick reference for RE challenges. For detailed techniques, see supporting files.
Additional Resources
- tools.md - Tool-specific commands (GDB, Ghidra, radare2, IDA)
- patterns.md - Common patterns, VMs, obfuscation, anti-debugging
Problem-Solving Workflow
- Start with strings extraction - many easy challenges have plaintext flags
- Try ltrace/strace - dynamic analysis often reveals flags without reversing
- Map control flow before modifying execution
- Automate manual processes via scripting (r2pipe, Python)
- Validate assumptions by comparing decompiler outputs
Quick Wins (Try First!)
# Plaintext flag extraction
strings binary | grep -E "flag\{|CTF\{|pico"
strings binary | grep -iE "flag|secret|password"
rabin2 -z binary | grep -i "flag"
# Dynamic analysis - often captures flag directly
ltrace ./binary
strace -f -s 500 ./binary
# Hex dump search
xxd binary | grep -i flag
# Run with test inputs
./binary AAAA
echo "test" | ./binary
Initial Analysis
file binary # Type, architecture
checksec --file=binary # Security features (for pwn)
chmod +x binary # Make executable
Memory Dumping Strategy
Key insight: Let the program compute the answer, then dump it.
gdb ./binary
start
b *main+0x198 # Break at final comparison
run
# Enter any input of correct length
x/s $rsi # Dump computed flag
x/38c $rsi # As characters
Decoy Flag Detection
Pattern: Multiple fake targets before real check.
Identification:
- Look for multiple comparison targets in sequence
- Check for different success messages
- Trace which comparison is checked LAST
Solution: Set breakpoint at FINAL comparison, not earlier ones.
GDB PIE Debugging
PIE binaries randomize base address. Use relative breakpoints:
gdb ./binary
start # Forces PIE base resolution
b *main+0xca # Relative to main
run
Comparison Direction (Critical!)
Two patterns:
transform(flag) == stored_target- Reverse the transformtransform(stored_target) == flag- Flag IS the transformed data!
Pattern 2 solution: Don't reverse - just apply transform to stored target.
Common Encryption Patterns
- XOR with single byte - try all 256 values
- XOR with known plaintext (
flag{,CTF{) - RC4 with hardcoded key
- Custom permutation + XOR
- XOR with position index (
^ ior^ (i & 0xff)) layered with a repeating key
Quick Tool Reference
# Radare2
r2 -d ./binary # Debug mode
aaa # Analyze
afl # List functions
pdf @ main # Disassemble main
# Ghidra (headless)
analyzeHeadless project/ tmp -import binary -postScript script.py
# IDA
ida64 binary # Open in IDA64
Binary Types
Python .pyc
import marshal, dis
with open('file.pyc', 'rb') as f:
f.read(16) # Skip header
code = marshal.load(f)
dis.dis(code)
WASM
wasm2c checker.wasm -o checker.c
gcc -O3 checker.c wasm-rt-impl.c -o checker
Android APK
apktool d app.apk -o decoded/ # Best - decodes resources
jadx app.apk # Decompile to Java
grep -r "flag" decoded/res/values/strings.xml
.NET
- dnSpy - debugging + decompilation
- ILSpy - decompiler
Packed (UPX)
upx -d packed -o unpacked
Anti-Debugging Bypass
Common checks:
IsDebuggerPresent()(Windows)ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME)(Linux)/proc/self/statusTracerPid- Timing checks
Bypass: Set breakpoint at check, modify register to bypass conditional.
S-Box / Keystream Patterns
Xorshift32: Shifts 13, 17, 5
Xorshift64: Shifts 12, 25, 27
Magic constants: 0x2545f4914f6cdd1d, 0x9e3779b97f4a7c15
Custom VM Analysis
- Identify structure: registers, memory, IP
- Reverse
executeInsfor opcode meanings - Write disassembler mapping opcodes to mnemonics
- Often easier to bruteforce than fully reverse
- Look for the bytecode file loaded via command-line arg
VM challenge workflow (C'est La V(M)ie):
# 1. Find entry point: entry() → __libc_start_main(FUN_xxx, ...)
# 2. Identify loader function (reads .bin file into global buffer)
# 3. Find executor with giant switch statement (opcode dispatch)
# 4. Map each case to instruction: MOVI, ADD, XOR, CMP, JZ, READ, PRINT, HLT...
# 5. Write disassembler, annotate output
# 6. Identify flag transform (often reversible byte-by-byte)
Common VM opcodes to look for:
| Pattern in decompiler | Likely instruction |
|---|---|
global[param1] = param2 | MOVI (move immediate) |
global[p1] = global[p2] | MOVR (move register) |
global[p1] ^= global[p2] | XOR |
global[p1] op global[p2]; set flag | CMP |
if (flag) IP = param | JZ/JNZ |
read(stdin, &global[p1], 1) | READ |
write(stdout, &global[p1], 1) |
Python Bytecode Reversing
Pattern (Slithering Bytes): Given dis.dis() output of a flag checker.
Key instructions:
LOAD_GLOBAL/LOAD_FAST— push name/variable onto stackCALL N— pop function + N args, call, push resultBINARY_SUBSCR— pop index and sequence, pushseq[idx]COMPARE_OP— pop two values, compare (55=!=, 40===)POP_JUMP_IF_TRUE/FALSE— conditional branch
Reversing XOR flag checkers:
# Pattern: ord(flag[i]) ^ KEY == EXPECTED[i]
# Reverse: chr(EXPECTED[i] ^ KEY) for each position
# Interleaved tables (odd/even indices):
odd_table = [...] # Values for indices 1, 3, 5, ...
even_table = [...] # Values for indices 0, 2, 4, ...
flag = [''] * 30
for i, val in enumerate(even_table):
flag[i*2] = chr(val ^ key_even)
for i, val in enumerate(odd_table):
flag[i*2+1] = chr(val ^ key_odd)
Signal-Based Binary Exploration
Pattern (Signal Signal Little Star): Binary uses UNIX signals as a binary tree navigation mechanism.
Identification:
- Multiple
sigaction()calls withSA_SIGINFO sigaltstack()setup (alternate signal stack)- Handler decodes embedded payload, installs next pair of signals
- Two types: Node (installs children) vs Leaf (prints message + exits)
Solving approach:
- Hook
sigactionviaLD_PRELOADto log signal installations - DFS through the binary tree by sending signals
- At each stage, observe which 2 signals are installed
- Send one, check if program exits (leaf) or installs 2 more (node)
- If wrong leaf, backtrack and try sibling
// LD_PRELOAD interposer to log sigaction calls
int sigaction(int signum, const struct sigaction *act, ...) {
if (act && (act->sa_flags & SA_SIGINFO))
log("SET %d SA_SIGINFO=1\n", signum);
return real_sigaction(signum, act, oldact);
}
Malware Anti-Analysis Bypass via Patching
Pattern (Carrot): Malware with multiple environment checks before executing payload.
Common checks to patch:
| Check | Technique | Patch |
|---|---|---|
ptrace(PTRACE_TRACEME) | Anti-debug | Change cmp -1 to cmp 0 |
sleep(150) | Anti-sandbox timing | Change sleep value to 1 |
/proc/cpuinfo "hypervisor" | Anti-VM | Flip JNZ to JZ |
| "VMware"/"VirtualBox" strings | Anti-VM | Flip JNZ to JZ |
getpwuid username check | Environment | Flip comparison |
LD_PRELOAD check | Anti-hook | Skip check |
| Fan count / hardware check | Anti-VM | Flip JLE to JGE |
| Hostname check | Environment | Flip JNZ to JZ |
Ghidra patching workflow:
- Find check function, identify the conditional jump
- Click on instruction →
Ctrl+Shift+G→ modify opcode - For
JNZ(0x75) →JZ(0x74), or vice versa - For immediate values: change operand bytes directly
- Export: press
O→ choose "Original File" format chmod +xthe patched binary
Server-side validation bypass:
- If patched binary sends system info to remote server, patch the data too
- Modify string addresses in data-gathering functions
- Change format strings to embed correct values directly
Expected Values Tables
Locating:
objdump -s -j .rodata binary | less
# Look near comparison instructions
# Size matches flag length
x86-64 Gotchas
Sign extension: 0xffffffc7 behaves differently in XOR vs addition
# For XOR: use low byte
esi_xor = esi & 0xff
# For addition: use full value with overflow
result = (r13 + esi) & 0xffffffff
Iterative Solver Pattern
for pos in range(flag_length):
for c in range(256):
computed = compute_output(c, current_state)
if computed == EXPECTED[pos]:
flag.append(c)
update_state(c, computed)
break
Uniform transform shortcut: if changing one input byte only changes one output byte, build a 0..255 mapping by repeating a single byte across the whole input, then invert.
Unicorn Emulation (Complex State)
from unicorn import *
from unicorn.x86_const import *
mu = Uc(UC_ARCH_X86, UC_MODE_64)
# Map segments, set up stack
# Hook to trace register changes
mu.emu_start(start_addr, end_addr)
Mixed-mode pitfall: if a 64-bit stub jumps into 32-bit code via retf/retfq, you must
switch to a UC_MODE_32 emulator and copy GPRs, EFLAGS, and XMM regs; missing XMM state
will corrupt SSE-based transforms.
Multi-Stage Shellcode Loaders
Pattern (I Heard You Liked Loaders): Nested shellcode with XOR decode loops and anti-debug.
Debugging workflow:
- Break at
call raxin launcher, step into shellcode - Bypass ptrace anti-debug: step to syscall,
set $rax=0 - Step through XOR decode loop (or break on
int3if hidden) - Repeat for each stage until final payload
Flag extraction from mov instructions:
# Final stage loads flag 4 bytes at a time via mov ebx, value
# Extract little-endian 4-byte chunks
values = [0x6174654d, 0x7b465443, ...] # From disassembly
flag = b''.join(v.to_bytes(4, 'little') for v in values)
Timing Side-Channel Attack
Pattern (Clock Out): Validation time varies per correct character (longer sleep on match).
Exploitation:
import time
from pwn import *
flag = ""
for pos in range(flag_length):
best_char, best_time = '', 0
for c in string.printable:
io = remote(host, port)
start = time.time()
io.sendline((flag + c).ljust(total_len, 'X'))
io.recvall()
elapsed = time.time() - start
if elapsed > best_time:
best_time = elapsed
best_char = c
io.close()
flag += best_char
Godot Game Asset Extraction
Pattern (Steal the Xmas): Encrypted Godot .pck packages.
Tools:
Workflow:
- Run KeyDot against game executable → extract encryption key
- Input key into gdsdecomp
- Extract and open project in Godot editor
- Search scripts/resources for flag data
Unstripped Binary Information Leaks
Pattern (Bad Opsec): Debug info and file paths leak author identity.
Quick checks:
strings binary | grep "/home/" # Home directory paths
strings binary | grep "/Users/" # macOS paths
file binary # Check if stripped
readelf -S binary | grep debug # Debug sections present?
Custom Mangle Function Reversing
Pattern (Flag Appraisal): Binary mangles input 2 bytes at a time with intermediate state, compares to static target.
Approach:
- Extract static target bytes from
.rodatasection - Understand mangle: processes pairs with running state value
- Write inverse function (process in reverse, undo each operation)
- Feed target bytes through inverse → recovers flag
Hex-Encoded String Comparison
Pattern (Spider's Curse): Input converted to hex, compared against hex constant.
Quick solve: Extract hex constant from strings/Ghidra, decode:
echo "4d65746143..." | xxd -r -p
