Cairo/StarkNet Vulnerability Scanner

Cairo/​StarkNet Vulnerability Scanner

1. Purpose

Systematically scan Cairo smart contracts on StarkNet for platform-specific security vulnerabilities related to arithmetic, cross-layer messaging, and cryptographic operations. This skill encodes 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Cairo/​StarkNet ecosystem.

2. When to Use This Skill

• Auditing StarkNet smart contracts (Cairo)
• Reviewing L1-L2 bridge implementations
• Pre-launch security assessment of StarkNet applications
• Validating cross-layer message handling
• Reviewing signature verification logic
• Assessing L1 handler functions

3. Platform Detection

File Extensions & Indicators

• Cairo files: .cairo

Language/​Framework Markers

// Cairo contract indicators
#[contract]
mod MyContract {
    use starknet::ContractAddress;

    #[storage]
    struct Storage {
        balance: LegacyMap<ContractAddress, felt252>,
    }

    #[external(v0)]
    fn transfer(ref self: ContractState, to: ContractAddress, amount: felt252) {
        // Contract logic
    }

    #[l1_handler]
    fn handle_deposit(ref self: ContractState, from_address: felt252, amount: u256) {
        // L1 message handler
    }
}

// Common patterns
felt252, u128, u256
ContractAddress, EthAddress
#[external(v0)], #[l1_handler], #[constructor]
get_caller_address(), get_contract_address()
send_message_to_l1_syscall

Project Structure

• src/​contract.cairo - Main contract implementation
• src/​lib.cairo - Library modules
• tests/ - Contract tests
• Scarb.toml - Cairo project configuration

Tool Support

• Caracal: Trail of Bits static analyzer for Cairo
• Installation: pip install caracal
• Usage: caracal detect src/
• cairo-test: Built-in testing framework
• Starknet Foundry: Testing and development toolkit

---

4. How This Skill Works

When invoked, I will:

1. Search your codebase for Cairo files
2. Analyze each contract for the 6 vulnerability patterns
3. Report findings with file references and severity
4. Provide fixes for each identified issue
5. Check L1-L2 interactions for messaging vulnerabilities

---

5. Example Output

When vulnerabilities are found, you'll get a report like this:

=== CAIRO/​STARKNET VULNERABILITY SCAN RESULTS ===


---

## 5. Vulnerability Patterns (6 Patterns)

I check for 6 critical vulnerability patterns unique to Cairo/​Starknet. For detailed detection patterns, code examples, mitigations, and testing strategies, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/​VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).

### Pattern Summary:

1. **Unchecked Arithmetic** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Integer overflow/​underflow in felt252
2. **Storage Collision** ⚠️ CRITICAL - Conflicting storage variable hashes
3. **Missing Access Control** ⚠️ CRITICAL - No caller validation on sensitive functions
4. **Improper Felt252 Boundaries** ⚠️ HIGH - Not validating felt252 range
5. **Unvalidated Contract Address** ⚠️ HIGH - Using untrusted contract addresses
6. **Missing Caller Validation** ⚠️ CRITICAL - No get_caller_address() checks

For complete vulnerability patterns with code examples, see [VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md](resources/​VULNERABILITY_PATTERNS.md).
## 5. Scanning Workflow

### Step 1: Platform Identification
1. Verify Cairo language and StarkNet framework
2. Check Cairo version (Cairo 1.0+ vs legacy Cairo 0)
3. Locate contract files (`src/​*.cairo`)
4. Identify L1-L2 bridge contracts (if applicable)

### Step 2: Arithmetic Safety Sweep
```bash
# Find felt252 usage in arithmetic
rg "felt252" src/ | rg "[-+*/]"

# Find balance/​amount storage using felt252
rg "felt252" src/ | rg "balance|amount|total|supply"

# Should prefer u128, u256 instead

Step 3: L1 Handler Analysis

For each #[l1_handler] function:

• Validates from_address parameter
• Checks address != zero
• Has proper access control
• Emits events for monitoring

Step 4: Signature Verification Review

For signature-based functions:

• Includes nonce tracking
• Nonce incremented after use
• Domain separator includes chain ID and contract address
• Cannot replay signatures

Step 5: L1-L2 Bridge Audit

If contract includes bridge functionality:

• L1 validates address < STARKNET_FIELD_PRIME
• L1 implements message cancellation
• L2 validates from_address in handlers
• Symmetric access controls L1 ↔ L2
• Test full roundtrip flows

Step 6: Static Analysis with Caracal

# Run Caracal detectors
caracal detect src/

# Specific detectors
caracal detect src/ --detectors unchecked-felt252-arithmetic
caracal detect src/ --detectors unchecked-l1-handler-from
caracal detect src/ --detectors missing-nonce-validation

---

6. Reporting Format

Finding Template

## [CRITICAL] Unchecked from_address in L1 Handler

**Location**: `src/​bridge.cairo:145-155` (handle_deposit function)

**Description**:
The `handle_deposit` L1 handler function does not validate the `from_address` parameter. Any L1 contract can send messages to this function and mint tokens for arbitrary users, bypassing the intended L1 bridge access controls.

**Vulnerable Code**:
```rust
// bridge.cairo, line 145
#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(
    ref self: ContractState,
    from_address: felt252,  // Not validated!
    user: ContractAddress,
    amount: u256
) {
    let current_balance = self.balances.read(user);
    self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount);
}

Attack Scenario:

1. Attacker deploys malicious L1 contract
2. Malicious contract calls starknetCore.sendMessageToL2(l2Contract, selector, [attacker_address, 1000000])
3. L2 handler processes message without checking sender
4. Attacker receives 1,000,000 tokens without depositing any funds
5. Protocol suffers infinite mint vulnerability

Recommendation: Validate from_address against authorized L1 bridge:

#[l1_handler]
fn handle_deposit(
    ref self: ContractState,
    from_address: felt252,
    user: ContractAddress,
    amount: u256
) {
    // Validate L1 sender
    let authorized_l1_bridge = self.l1_bridge_address.read();
    assert(from_address == authorized_l1_bridge, 'Unauthorized L1 sender');

    let current_balance = self.balances.read(user);
    self.balances.write(user, current_balance + amount);
}

References:

• building-secure-contracts/​not-so-smart-contracts/​cairo/​unchecked_l1_handler_from
• Caracal detector: unchecked-l1-handler-from

---

## 7. Priority Guidelines

### Critical (Immediate Fix Required)
- Unchecked from_address in L1 handlers (infinite mint)
- L1-L2 address conversion issues (funds to zero address)

### High (Fix Before Deployment)
- Felt252 arithmetic overflow/​underflow (balance manipulation)
- Missing signature replay protection (replay attacks)
- L1-L2 message failure without cancellation (locked funds)

### Medium (Address in Audit)
- Overconstrained L1-L2 interactions (trapped funds)

---

## 8. Testing Recommendations

### Unit Tests
```rust
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_felt252_overflow() {
        // Test arithmetic edge cases
    }

    #[test]
    #[should_panic]
    fn test_unauthorized_l1_handler() {
        // Wrong from_address should fail
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_signature_replay_protection() {
        // Same signature twice should fail
    }
}

Integration Tests (with L1)

// Test full L1-L2 flow
#[test]
fn test_deposit_withdraw_roundtrip() {
    // 1. Deposit on L1
    // 2. Wait for L2 processing
    // 3. Verify L2 balance
    // 4. Withdraw to L1
    // 5. Verify L1 balance restored
}

Caracal CI Integration

# .github/​workflows/​security.yml
- name: Run Caracal
  run: |
    pip install caracal
    caracal detect src/ --fail-on high,critical

---

9. Additional Resources

• Building Secure Contracts: building-secure-contracts/​not-so-smart-contracts/​cairo/
• Caracal: https://github.com/​crytic/​caracal
• Cairo Documentation: https://book.cairo-lang.org/
• StarkNet Documentation: https://docs.starknet.io/
• OpenZeppelin Cairo Contracts: https://github.com/​OpenZeppelin/​cairo-contracts

---

10. Quick Reference Checklist

Before completing Cairo/​StarkNet audit:

Arithmetic Safety (HIGH):

• No felt252 used for balances/​amounts (use u128/​u256)
• OR felt252 arithmetic has explicit bounds checking
• Overflow/​underflow scenarios tested

L1 Handler Security (CRITICAL):

• ALL #[l1_handler] functions validate from_address
• from_address compared against stored L1 contract address
• Cannot bypass by deploying alternate L1 contract

L1-L2 Messaging (HIGH):

• L1 bridge validates addresses < STARKNET_FIELD_PRIME
• L1 bridge implements message cancellation
• L2 handlers check from_address
• Symmetric validation rules L1 ↔ L2
• Full roundtrip flows tested

Signature Security (HIGH):

• Signatures include nonce tracking
• Nonce incremented after each use
• Domain separator includes chain ID and contract address
• Signature replay tested and prevented
• Cross-chain replay prevented

Tool Usage:

• Caracal scan completed with no critical findings
• Unit tests cover all vulnerability scenarios
• Integration tests verify L1-L2 flows
• Testnet deployment tested before mainnet