philosopher-brainchild

Philosopher Brainchild Continuation Model

Model Details

Model Description

A model that continues philosophical sentences.

• Developed by: wildfellhall
• Model type: Text Generation
• Language(s) (NLP): English
• License: MIT
• Finetuned from model: Llama 3 8B (unsloth/llama-3-8b-bnb-4bit)

Model Sources

<!-- Provide the basic links for the model. -->

• Repository: https://github.com/wildfellhall/PhilosopherBrainchild

Notes

Works best when downloaded and ran through llama ccp with a specific system prompt and max token limit

Sample Responses

Square brackets denote prompts. [We come to, through this circuitous path of cogitation, the conclusion that] the conscientious faculties of the human mind are the only ones which deserve to be considered as moral causes, and that the only moral effects which can be ascribed to them are those which are produced by their influence on the will. It is evident that the moral worth of an action does not consist in the effect expected from it, nor even in the maxim from which the action is done, but purely and simply in the deed itself considered as such, and independently of all the consequences which may follow from it. For otherwise there would always remain the possibility that we might have done the same thing from a very different maxim, and that we might have been even forced to it by an external necessity, so that in that case the moral worth of the deed would be lost. The pre-eminent good which we call moral can therefore consist in nothing else than the conception of a worth which even we ourselves respect. (oldest result, before slight changes were made)

[The human mind, in its incessant pursuit of all that is enigmatic pertaining to its own existence, often fails to arrive at the conclusion that], in order to explain what it is and whence it comes, it has merely to appeal to the only thing that it knows—namely, itself. But this is just what it shuns, because in so doing it would be obliged to admit that it is the creator of all the categories of thought with which it seeks to comprehend itself. As a matter of fact, it is quite impossible to explain this cognition, with all its peculiarities, by any means other than those furnished by the cognition itself. We may, it is true, attempt to explain it by the analogy of phenomena, or of other forms of nature, or even by a reference to an intelligent cause, which is the substratum of our own ego; but we must never forget that all these are mere analogies, and that we cannot, by their aid, discover a single one of the properties which constitute the essence of the soul. Thus we can never hope to reach the soul in its transcendental purity, or to attain to any clear insight into the mode in which it is affected by things, or how it is connected with the world of phenomena.