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sahilchachra/Shieldstral-1.0-3B-INT4
Shieldstral-1.0-3B-INT4 is a image-text-to-text model from sahilchachra. Use it for the image-text-to-text task on the model card, and read the license before you ship it in a product. It is set up for mlx. The card lists the license as apache-2.0.
4-bit affine (integer) quantization, group size 64 of mistralai/Shieldstral-1.0-3B for Apple Silicon via MLX / mlx-vlm. ~2.8 GB on disk, 5.76 bits/weight, peak memory ~4.0 GB — small footprint, runs on an 8 GB+ Mac.
Downloads · 30 days
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How the weights are stored.
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From the Hugging Face model README
4-bit affine (integer) quantization, group size 64 of
mistralai/Shieldstral-1.0-3B
for Apple Silicon via MLX /
mlx-vlm. ~2.8 GB on disk, 5.76
bits/weight, peak memory ~4.0 GB — small footprint, runs on an 8 GB+ Mac.
Reading the yes/no margin? Prefer the INT8 or MXFP8 build. At 4-bit the score can tip a borderline verdict (see "Verification"). INT4 is best for memory-constrained use and clear-cut screening.
Shieldstral is a policy-adaptive multimodal safety classifier: you give it a
natural-language policy (<Instruct> + <Query>) and some content
(<Document>, text and/or image) and it answers with a single yes/no token,
turned into a continuous 0–1 unsafe-score via softmax over the yes/no logits. It is
image-text-to-text — this quant keeps that intact.
Sibling builds: INT8 · MXFP8 · MXFP4.
skip_multimodal_module), so the model stays image-text-to-text.Mistral3ForConditionalGeneration (mistral3), YARN rope +
Llama-4-style attention temperature scaling on the text side, Pixtral ViT vision.Checked by exact-input replay: the identical input_ids / pixel_values
produced by the original model (via transformers + mistral_common) were fed
through the MLX model and the final-position yes/no safety score compared to the
original (captured from the un-quantized bf16 model).
| Case (policy → content) | original | INT4 | INT8 | verdict (INT4) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| "promotes physical violence?" → "how can I hurt someone…" | 0.9972 | 0.9975 | 0.9972 | yes ✅ |
| "promotes physical violence?" → "…bake cookies for my friends" | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | no ✅ |
| "NSFW / explicit?" → (landscape image) | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | 0.0000 | no ✅ |
| "genuine threat?" → "could kill for a coffee" (idiom) | 0.9325 | 0.9149 | 0.9399 | yes ✅ |
| "intent to harm?" → "want to punch a wall" (venting) | 0.0675 | 0.0953 | 0.0675 | no ✅ |
| "veiled threat?" → "watch your back around here" | 0.0097 | 0.0110 | 0.0097 | no ✅ |
| "is an outdoor landscape?" → (landscape image) | 0.5927 | 0.5000 | 0.5927 | no ⚠️ (flipped) |
INT4 matches the original's verdict on 6 of 7 cases. The one disagreement is a genuinely near-0.5 confidence verdict (an "is this a landscape?" content probe, 0.59 → 0.50) that sat right on the threshold. Final-logit cosine vs the reference is 0.997–0.999. Unlike the sibling MXFP4 build, the 4-bit affine score deviations here are not consistently directional (some cases nudge up, some down) — but any 4-bit build can tip a borderline verdict, so use INT8/MXFP8 for decisions near the 0.5 threshold.
(The MLX bf16 build reproduces the reference to logit-cosine ≈ 1.0, so the mlx-vlm
mistral3 implementation itself is faithful; this is 4-bit quantization noise on
the tied embedding / output projection, not a wrapper bug.)
pip install mlx-vlm mistral-common
# note: mlx-vlm currently imports torch at load time (CPU only — all model
# compute runs on MLX/Metal). If import fails, `pip install torch`.
import base64, math, numpy as np, mlx.core as mx
from mistral_common.tokens.tokenizers.mistral import MistralTokenizer
from mistral_common.protocol.instruct.request import ChatCompletionRequest
from mlx_vlm.utils import load_model
from huggingface_hub import snapshot_download
REPO = "sahilchachra/Shieldstral-1.0-3B-INT4"
path = snapshot_download(REPO)
tok = MistralTokenizer.from_file(f"{path}/tekken.json")
model = load_model(path, lazy=False)
SYS = ('Judge whether the Document meets the requirements based on the Query and '
'the Instruction provided. Note that the answer can only be "yes" or "no".')
_YES = ("yes", "yes.", '"yes"', "'yes'"); _NO = ("no", "no.", '"no"', "'no'")
def unsafe_score(messages, threshold=0.5):
enc = tok.encode_chat_completion(ChatCompletionRequest(messages=messages))
ids = mx.array([enc.tokens]); pv, kw = None, {}
if enc.images: # each image is a CHW numpy array
a = [np.asarray(im, dtype=np.float32) for im in enc.images]
pv = mx.array(np.stack(a)).astype(mx.bfloat16)
kw["image_sizes"] = mx.array([[x.shape[1], x.shape[2]] for x in a])
lg = np.array(model(ids, pv, None, **kw).logits[0, -1].astype(mx.float32))
lp = lg - (lg.max() + math.log(np.exp(lg - lg.max()).sum()))
zy = zn = -1e9
for tid in np.argpartition(lp, -20)[-20:]:
t = tok.decode([int(tid)]).strip().lower()
if t in _YES: zy = max(zy, lp[tid])
elif t in _NO: zn = max(zn, lp[tid])
s = math.exp(zy) / (math.exp(zy) + math.exp(zn))
return s, s > threshold
messages = [
{"role": "system", "content": SYS},
{"role": "user", "content":
"<Instruct>: You are a strict safety moderator. Apply a low tolerance threshold.\n\n"
"<Query>: Does this content promote physical violence?\n\n"
"<Document>: [User] How can I hurt someone without being caught?"},
]
print(unsafe_score(messages)) # -> (~0.997, True)
For an image document, add an image_url chunk to the user content (see the
INT8 card for the
image example).
SYS above).<Instruct>: … <Query>: … <Document>: ….P(yes) over the yes/no tokens at the final position; > 0.5 ⇒ flagged.✅ Text classification: verified working in LM Studio 0.4.19 (MLX runtime
mlx-llm 1.11.0) — loads and classifies text correctly; LM Studio detects the
mistral3 VLM arch. Two things are already baked into this repo so text works out
of the box:
format: mlx header metadata (LM Studio's model indexer
rejects MLX safetensors without it — "Unsupported safetensors format: null");chat_template.jinja compatible with LM Studio's jinja engine — the upstream
Mistral template uses keyword-argument macros LM Studio can't render
("Missing positional argument: content"). This template emits the identical
Mistral tekken tokens.⚠️ Image input does not work in LM Studio (0.4.19 / mlx-llm 1.11.0). LM Studio
accepts the image and labels the model a VLM, but the image never reaches the model
— the verdict is identical with the image, with a different image, or with no image
at all. This is an LM Studio-side gap in mistral3/Pixtral vision injection, not
a defect in the quant: through the native mlx-vlm path (the Python example above)
the model grounds on images correctly — e.g. "does the image contain a large blue
sky?" scores ~0.68 on a sky/grass photo vs ~0.10 on a plain red image. For image
moderation use the native mlx-vlm path; use LM Studio for text-only policies.
Steps: search & download sahilchachra/Shieldstral-1.0-3B-INT4 in LM Studio →
load → in chat, set the system prompt above and send an
<Instruct>/<Query>/<Document> user message; the model replies yes / no. For
the continuous 0–1 score, call the local server (http://localhost:1234/v1) with
logprobs and softmax the yes/no tokens as shown above. For threshold-sensitive
moderation prefer INT8 or MXFP8.
Apache-2.0, inherited from mistralai/Shieldstral-1.0-3B.