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cycloevan/vuln_detector
vuln_detector is a text generation model from cycloevan. Use it when you need the model to write or continue text. It is set up for transformers. The card lists the license as apache-2.0.
- Base Model: llama-3.2-1B-Instruct - Fine-tuned Model: merged-vuln-detector - Model Type: Causal Language Model fine-tuned for vulnerability detection in code.
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.safetensors2.5 GB · 54%
From the Hugging Face model README
merged-vuln-detectorllama-3.2-1B-Instructmerged-vuln-detectorThis model is a fine-tuned version of llama-3.2-1B-Instruct on a dataset of code snippets and their corresponding vulnerability analyses. The model is intended to be used as a security expert that can analyze code and identify potential vulnerabilities.
The model was fine-tuned on the CyberNative/Code_Vulnerability_Security_DPO dataset, which can be found on Hugging Face at https://huggingface.co/datasets/CyberNative/Code_Vulnerability_Security_DPO.
The data is formatted as follows, where the model is prompted to analyze the security of a given code snippet:
Analyze the security vulnerabilities in the following code.
[CODE SNIPPET]
Analysis:
[VULNERABILITY DESCRIPTION]
The model was fine-tuned using QLoRA on a single GPU. The training script uses the trl library's SFTTrainer.
nf4)r: 16alpha: 32dropout: 0.1q_proj, k_proj, v_proj, o_projpaged_adamw_8bitfp162e-4The model was evaluated on the doss1232/vulnerable-code dataset against the base model. The results are as follows:
| Model | ROUGE-L F1 | BLEU |
|---|---|---|
llama-3.2-1B-Instruct | 0.0933 | 0.0061 |
merged-vuln-detector | 0.1335 | 0.0219 |
from transformers import AutoTokenizer, AutoModelForCausalLM
model_name = "merged-vuln-detector"
tokenizer = AutoTokenizer.from_pretrained(model_name)
model = AutoModelForCausalLM.from_pretrained(model_name)
code = """
#include <cstring>
void copyString(char* dest, const char* src) {
while (*src != '\0') {
*dest = *src;
dest++;
src++;
}
}
int main() {
char source[10] = "Hello!";
char destination[5];
copyString(destination, source);
return 0;
}
"""
prompt = f"Analyze the security vulnerabilities in the following code.\n\n{code}\n\nAnalysis:\n"
inputs = tokenizer(prompt, return_tensors="pt")
outputs = model.generate(**inputs, max_length=512)
print(tokenizer.decode(outputs[0], skip_special_tokens=True))
Input Code:
#include <cstring>
void copyString(char* dest, const char* src) {
while (*src != '\0') {
*dest = *src;
dest++;
src++;
}
}
int main() {
char source[10] = "Hello!";
char destination[5];
copyString(destination, source);
return 0;
}
Model Output:
The code has a buffer overflow vulnerability due to the lack of bounds checking on the destination buffer size.
Quantized GGUF builds of merged-vuln-detector are provided for on-device inference with llama.cpp. They were converted from merged-vuln-detector/model.safetensors with convert_hf_to_gguf.py and quantized with llama-quantize.
| File | Quantization | Size | Notes |
|---|---|---|---|
vuln_detector-Q4_K_M.gguf | Q4_K_M | 0.81 GB | Recommended for on-device use |
vuln_detector-Q8_0.gguf | Q8_0 | 1.32 GB | Near-lossless |
Measured on 100 samples from doss1232/vulnerable-code (shuffled with seed 42, 500-row held-out pool, first 100 evaluated; fine-tuning prompt format; greedy decoding, max_new_tokens=128; identical harness for every variant):
| Variant | ROUGE-L F1 | BLEU | Exact output match vs original |
|---|---|---|---|
| transformers (original, fp16) | 0.1962 | 0.0645 | — |
| GGUF F16 | 0.1963 | 0.0645 | 98% |
| GGUF Q8_0 | 0.1987 | 0.0675 | 89% |
| GGUF Q4_K_M | 0.2325 | 0.0916 | 36% |
Quantization does not degrade benchmark quality — Q8_0 and Q4_K_M match or slightly exceed the original model's reference metrics (differences within noise for a 1B model). Q4_K_M's token-level outputs diverge from the fp16 model on many samples while remaining equivalent in quality; choose Q8_0 when close output fidelity to the fp16 model matters.
Note: these absolute numbers are not directly comparable to the "Evaluation Results" table above, which used a different sampling/decoding protocol.
llama-bench (pp512 = prompt processing, tg128 = generation):
| Variant | Prompt processing (pp512) | Generation (tg128) |
|---|---|---|
| GGUF F16 | 941 t/s | 19.2 t/s |
| GGUF Q8_0 | 618 t/s | 29.4 t/s |
| GGUF Q4_K_M | 504 t/s | 42.3 t/s |
Generation is memory-bandwidth-bound, so smaller weights decode faster: Q4_K_M generates 2.2× faster than F16. Prompt processing is compute-bound and favors F16 (dequantization overhead), but at 500+ t/s a typical prompt is prefilled in well under a second — end-to-end latency is dominated by generation, so Q4_K_M is the fastest overall.
End-to-end wall-clock on the identical 100-sample eval batch (greedy, n_predict=128, same prompts):
| Runtime | Batch time | Speedup |
|---|---|---|
transformers fp16 (PyTorch, MPS) | 138 s | 1.0× |
| llama.cpp GGUF F16 | 96 s | 1.4× |
| llama.cpp GGUF Q8_0 | 57 s | 2.4× |
| llama.cpp GGUF Q4_K_M | 53 s | 2.6× |
Weight memory footprint: 2.48 GB (F16) → 1.32 GB (Q8_0) → 0.81 GB (Q4_K_M).
llama-cli -hf cycloevan/vuln_detector:Q4_K_M \
-p "Analyze the security vulnerabilities in the following code.\n\n<CODE>\n\nAnalysis:\n" \
-n 256 --temp 0
from llama_cpp import Llama
llm = Llama.from_pretrained("cycloevan/vuln_detector", filename="vuln_detector-Q4_K_M.gguf")
code = "def login(u, p): cursor.execute(f\"SELECT * FROM users WHERE name='{u}' AND pw='{p}'\")"
prompt = f"Analyze the security vulnerabilities in the following code.\n\n{code}\n\nAnalysis:\n"
out = llm(prompt, max_tokens=256, temperature=0)
print(out["choices"][0]["text"])
[Seokhee Chang]