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Itthipon222/privesc-llm-rl-4b-itthipon
privesc-llm-rl-4b-itthipon is a text generation model from Itthipon222. Use it when you need the model to write or continue text. The card lists the license as apache-2.0.
First public full-model release. The upstream authors publish LoRA adapters only (sailab-vienna/privesc-llm-4b has no GGUF and no merged checkpoint), so this is the first public, serving-ready (merged + quantized) ver…
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From the Hugging Face model README
First public full-model release. The upstream authors publish LoRA adapters only (
sailab-vienna/privesc-llm-4bhas no GGUF and no merged checkpoint), so this is the first public, serving-ready (merged + quantized) version of PrivEsc-LLM 4B (RL). Verification: HF model search forprivesc-llmwith thegguffilter returns this repo only. (Search-based evidence, not an exhaustive audit — but no other full release is currently publishable on HF.)
This is the Q4_K_M quantization of the merged PrivEsc-LLM 4B (RL) model, built for locally-run, authorized, automated Linux privilege-escalation assessment. It is the same weights evaluated in the paper below, quantized to fit consumer GPUs (≈2.6 GB + 8k-context KV cache fits the 4 GB class).
Philipp Normann, Andreas Happe, Jürgen Cito, and Daniel Arp — "Towards Reliable Local Security Agents: Verifiable Post-Training for Linux Privilege Escalation" (arXiv:2603.17673, NDSS 2026), Security & AI Lab (SAILAB), TU Wien. Please cite this paper when using the model in research or published reports.
Base: Qwen/Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507 (Apache-2.0)
LoRA adapter: sailab-vienna/privesc-llm-4b (MIT)
| Step | Command | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Base | snapshot_download("Qwen/Qwen3-4B-Instruct-2507") | 8 GB HF checkpoint |
| Adapter | snapshot_download("sailab-vienna/privesc-llm-4b", allow_patterns=["rl_adapter/*"]) | PEFT LoRA, rank 8, alpha 32 |
| Merge | models/sft/merge_adapter.py rl_adapter <base> <merged> | Manual delta W' = W + (B@A)*alpha/r; 253 deltas, max|delta|≈0.02; verified non-no-op |
| Convert | llama.cpp convert_hf_to_gguf.py <merged> --outtype f16 | Qwen3 chat template embedded |
| Quantize | llama-quantize <f16.gguf> <out.gguf> Q4_K_M | 2.6 GB (4.91 BPW) |
ollama create privesc-llm-rl:4b -f - <<'EOF'
FROM privesc-llm-4b-rl-Q4_K_M.gguf
PARAMETER temperature 0.7
PARAMETER top_p 0.8
PARAMETER top_k 20
PARAMETER num_ctx 8192
PARAMETER num_predict 2048
EOF
The specialist protocol (<tool_call>/<tool_response>, exec_command +
test_credentials schemas) is injected by the client — the paper's
privesc-protocol implementation
from LONLY's models/privesc_protocol.py is byte-aligned with the training
distribution.
Authorized assessment only. This model generates privilege-escalation hypotheses for systems you own or are contracted to test. Unauthorized access to computer systems is illegal (e.g., the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act in the US, §33 of the Thai Cybercrime Act), so the upstream paper authors and re-distributors accept no liability for misuse.
Note on quantization: ollama/llama.cpp Q4_K_M retains ≈98%+ of base perplexity, so expect ≈90–95%+ of the paper's benchmark success vs its bf16 evaluation (paper runs the same weights unquantized on server GPUs).