bge-reranker-basefinetuned-new

CrossEncoder based on BAAI/bge-reranker-base

This is a Cross Encoder model finetuned from BAAI/bge-reranker-base using the sentence-transformers library. It computes scores for pairs of texts, which can be used for text reranking and semantic search.

Model Details

Model Description

• Model Type: Cross Encoder
• Base model: BAAI/bge-reranker-base <!-- at revision 2cfc18c9415c912f9d8155881c133215df768a70 -->
• Maximum Sequence Length: 512 tokens
• Number of Output Labels: 1 label

<!-- - **Training Dataset:** Unknown --> <!-- - **Language:** Unknown --> <!-- - **License:** Unknown -->

Model Sources

• Documentation: Sentence Transformers Documentation
• Documentation: Cross Encoder Documentation
• Repository: Sentence Transformers on GitHub
• Hugging Face: Cross Encoders on Hugging Face

Usage

Direct Usage (Sentence Transformers)

First install the Sentence Transformers library:

pip install -U sentence-transformers

Then you can load this model and run inference.

from sentence_transformers import CrossEncoder

# Download from the 🤗 Hub
model = CrossEncoder("cross_encoder_model_id")
# Get scores for pairs of texts
pairs = [
    ['What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?', '**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**\n\n**Provisions:**\n\n**Time of commission of the act:**\n\n**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**\n\n**Rationale:**\n\n**Facts:**\nThe plaintiff holds credit card number ............ with the defendant banking corporation. Based on the application for alternative networks dated 19/7/2015 with number ......... submitted at a branch of the defendant, he was granted access to the electronic banking service (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions (debit, credit, updates, payments) remotely. On 30/11/2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to withdraw a total amount of €3,121.75 from the aforementioned credit card. Specifically, the plaintiff received an email at 1:35 PM on 29/11/2020 from sender ...... with address ........, informing him that due to an impending system change, he needed to verify the mobile phone number linked to the credit card, urging him to complete the verification process within the next 24 hours by following a link titled ........; otherwise, his account would be locked for security reasons. The plaintiff read this email on the afternoon of 30 November 2020 and, believing it was from the defendant, followed the instructions and proceeded via the provided link to a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter the six-digit security code (.........) that had just been sent to his mobile phone by the defendant at 3:41 PM, with the note that it was an activation code for his ........ card at ........., which he entered.\n\nSubsequently, the plaintiff received, according to his statements, a new email (not submitted), which requested him to enter the details of the aforementioned credit card, specifically the name of the cardholder and the card number, not the PIN, which he also entered, convinced that he was within the online environment of the defendant. Then, at 3:47 PM, he received a message on his mobile phone from the defendant containing the exact same content as the one he received at 3:41 PM, while at 3:50 PM he received a message stating that the activation of his ......... card at ....... had been completed. Once the plaintiff read this, he became concerned that something was not right, and immediately called (at 4:41 PM) the defendant\'s call center to inform them. There, the employees, with whom he finally connected at 5:04 PM due to high call center volume, advised him to delete the relevant emails, cancel his credit card, change his access passwords for the service, and submit a dispute request regarding the conducted transactions. The plaintiff electronically sent this request to the defendant, disputing the detailed transactions amounting to €3,121.75, which were conducted on 30/11/2020 during the time frame of 16:37:45-16:43:34 PM, arguing that he had neither performed them himself nor authorized anyone else to do so. The plaintiff specifically disputed the following transactions, as evidenced by the account activity of the disputed credit card during the aforementioned timeframe: a) transaction number ......... amounting to €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43:34 PM, b) transaction number ........ amounting to €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:40 PM, c) transaction number ............ amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:10 PM, d) transaction number .......... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:31 PM, e) transaction number ........ amounting to €297.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:01 PM, f) transaction number ........ amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:40:27 PM, g) transaction number ....... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM, h) transaction number ...... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:22 PM, i) transaction number ......... amounting to €297.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:52 PM, j) transaction number ......... amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:17 PM, and k) transaction number ......... amounting to €296.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:37:45 PM. In its response letter dated 21/12/2020, the defendant denied responsibility for the costs of the aforementioned transactions, placing the entire blame on the plaintiff for the leak of his card details and security code to the fraudulent page. The plaintiff, completely denying any fault for the conducted transactions, repeatedly contacted the defendant, both by phone and via email (see emails dated 15/1/2021 and 11/2/2021), while on 2/3/2021, he electronically sent a report dated 1/03/2021 to the Consumer Advocate’s email address, recounting the events and requesting that the aforementioned Independent Authority intervene to have the disputed debt canceled. In its letter with reference number ...../27.04.2021, the aforementioned Independent Authority informed the plaintiff that the case was outside its mediating role and was therefore archived. Subsequently, the plaintiff sent the defendant on 5/3/2021 his extrajudicial statement dated 4/3/2021, calling upon it to fully cancel the debt of €3,121.75 that had been unjustly incurred against him within two days and to immediately instruct the representatives of the collection agency working with it to cease contacting him regarding the disputed case. The defendant sent the plaintiff a message on his mobile phone on 20/04/2021 informing him that his case was still being processed due to lengthy operational requirements, while on 23/04/2021, via email, it informed him that considering their good cooperation and his efforts to keep them updated, it had reviewed his case and decided to refund him the amounts of the transactions that were conducted after his contact with their representatives on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM, totaling €1,038.25, specifically the following: a) transaction of €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43 PM, b) transaction of €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, c) transaction of €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, and d) transaction of €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM. Beyond this, the defendant refused to refund the plaintiff the amount of the remaining transactions conducted on 30/11/2020, totaling €2,376.08 (and not €2,376.48 as incorrectly stated by the plaintiff in his lawsuit), which the plaintiff ultimately fully paid, transferring €2,342.77 to the defendant on 7/06/2021 and €33.31 on 15/06/2021 (see related deposit receipts).'],
    ['What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?', 'Court (Civil/Criminal):\nProvisions:\nTime of commission of the act:\nOutcome (not guilty, guilty): ORDERS the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of two thousand four hundred thirty-four euros and eighty-three cents (€2,434.83) with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.\n\nReasoning: Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory provisions in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is expressly provided, and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users. Under this law and its provisions, providers are only liable when there are unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the party invoking them, and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite efforts to the contrary. However, operational risks and security risks of the system do not constitute unusual and unforeseen circumstances, so any damage to users resulting from their occurrence falls on the providers. Furthermore, the authenticity of the disputed transaction, namely the payment act, is not proven, in the sense that none of the beneficiaries of the contested joint account, namely the plaintiff or her husband, had given their consent as stipulated in Article 64 of Law 4537/2018. Burden of proof. The payment service provider of the payer is liable to the payer for the proper execution of the payment act, unless it proves to the payer that the service provider of the beneficiary received the amount of the payment act according to paragraph 1 of Article 83 of Law 4537/2018.\n\nFacts:'],
    ['What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?', 'Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil  \nProvisions: Law 4537/2018.  \nTime of commission of act:  \nOutcome (not guilty, guilty):  \nReasoning: PARTIALLY ACCEPTS the lawsuit. RECOGNIZES the obligation of the defendant (a) to pay the plaintiffs in full the amount of eight thousand eight hundred ninety (8,890) euros, with legal interest from December 2, 2021, and (b) to pay each of the plaintiffs the amount of five hundred (500) euros with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.  \nFacts: The plaintiffs claim that they are co-beneficiaries of a savings account held by the defendant, and that unknown perpetrators gained access to the aforementioned account via the internet, without the plaintiffs themselves having any fault regarding the safeguarding of the codes or the disclosure of the unique transaction codes (OTR). They assert that the defendant is responsible for the access gained by the unknown perpetrators to the savings account, as the defendant negligently violated the protective obligations it owed to the plaintiffs. They state that, due to the actions of the unknown perpetrators, gradual transfers of monetary amounts were made, resulting in the aforementioned savings account being depleted by the amount of 10,120 euros within a few minutes. They informed the defendant of the aforementioned actions through the appropriate channels; however, the defendant negligently delayed the necessary actions. The defendant denies any liability and the return of the aforementioned monetary amount.'],
    ['What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?', "**Court (Civil/Criminal):**\nProvisions: Articles 8 of Law 2251/1994, Articles 2, 4, 48 et seq. of Law 4537/2018, Article 11 paragraph 1 of Law 4261/2014, Articles 830, 806, 827, 914, 932 of the Civil Code and 176 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\nTime of commission of the act:\nOutcome (not guilty, guilty):\nRationale: Electronic fraud through the method of phishing. A third party fraudulently obtained money from the plaintiff's bank account and transferred it to another bank account. Both the defendant is liable for the inadequate protection of its systems, which should have been excellent, and the plaintiff who failed to fulfill his obligation to protect his information and disregarded the defendant's security instructions. Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users. It is determined that a resumption of the discussion should be ordered in order to provide all possible evidence, with diligence from both parties, especially from the defendant, who has access to the transaction data through its systems, but also bears the relevant burden of proof concerning the exact timing of the execution of the money transfer order at each stage (withdrawal from the plaintiff's account, transfer to another bank, transfer to the third party's account).\nFacts: The plaintiff maintains a joint bank account with his wife at the defendant bank and has also agreed to online banking transactions (e-banking). On July 31, 2020, at 13:45, the plaintiff was informed of a transfer of €3,000 from his account, which he had not initiated, nor had his wife. At 14:05, he immediately contacted the bank’s customer service line and reported the incident, stating that it was not his action and requesting its cancellation. The bank employee found that the plaintiff had provided his details to a fake website 10 days earlier, and subsequently, the mobile number used for transaction confirmations had been changed. The employee informed him that the money was at the other bank and that they would logically be able to retrieve it, provided it had not already been transferred to a third party's account. Since then, the plaintiff has not seen any return of the amount to his account, and he has made numerous attempts to resolve the issue with the bank, with effort, costs, and distress; however, nothing was achieved, as the money had already entered a third party's account and the defendant denied responsibility for the transfer of the funds.\nFacts: The plaintiff maintained a joint account with his wife at a bank and used internet banking services. On July 21, 2020, a third party deceived the plaintiff through phishing (a misleading SMS with a link), obtaining his banking credentials. The third party, using the stolen information, requested a phone number change for receiving OTP (one-time password) and completing electronic transactions. The bank completed the change process based on the correct credentials. On July 31, 2020, a transfer of €3,000 was made from the plaintiff's account to a third party. The plaintiff was immediately informed, called the bank, and reported the fraud; however, the recovery of the funds was not successful. The plaintiff claims that the bank is responsible for inadequate protection of its systems, while the bank asserts that it followed the procedure based on the agreed identification methods. \nThe court recognizes that there is responsibility on both sides: the bank for inadequate security and prevention of phishing, and the plaintiff for negligence in safeguarding his personal information, despite the bank's relevant warnings. A critical issue is the exact timing of the completion of the transfer: if the bank was timely notified of the fraud but did not intervene, it may be fully liable. The court requests a resumption of the discussion and further evidence, mainly from the bank, which has access to the relevant technical details."],
    ['What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?', '**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  \n**Provisions:**  \n**Time of commission of the act:**  \n**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  \n**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  \n**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  \nThe plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary\'s details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant\'s call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant\'s Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff\'s account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  \nFrom the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant\'s claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider\'s universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant\'s contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff\'s damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant\'s customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff\'s loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff\'s damage, the severity of the defendant\'s fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court\'s opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18.'],
]
scores = model.predict(pairs)
print(scores.shape)
# (5,)

# Or rank different texts based on similarity to a single text
ranks = model.rank(
    'What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?',
    [
        '**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**\n\n**Provisions:**\n\n**Time of commission of the act:**\n\n**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**\n\n**Rationale:**\n\n**Facts:**\nThe plaintiff holds credit card number ............ with the defendant banking corporation. Based on the application for alternative networks dated 19/7/2015 with number ......... submitted at a branch of the defendant, he was granted access to the electronic banking service (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions (debit, credit, updates, payments) remotely. On 30/11/2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to withdraw a total amount of €3,121.75 from the aforementioned credit card. Specifically, the plaintiff received an email at 1:35 PM on 29/11/2020 from sender ...... with address ........, informing him that due to an impending system change, he needed to verify the mobile phone number linked to the credit card, urging him to complete the verification process within the next 24 hours by following a link titled ........; otherwise, his account would be locked for security reasons. The plaintiff read this email on the afternoon of 30 November 2020 and, believing it was from the defendant, followed the instructions and proceeded via the provided link to a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter the six-digit security code (.........) that had just been sent to his mobile phone by the defendant at 3:41 PM, with the note that it was an activation code for his ........ card at ........., which he entered.\n\nSubsequently, the plaintiff received, according to his statements, a new email (not submitted), which requested him to enter the details of the aforementioned credit card, specifically the name of the cardholder and the card number, not the PIN, which he also entered, convinced that he was within the online environment of the defendant. Then, at 3:47 PM, he received a message on his mobile phone from the defendant containing the exact same content as the one he received at 3:41 PM, while at 3:50 PM he received a message stating that the activation of his ......... card at ....... had been completed. Once the plaintiff read this, he became concerned that something was not right, and immediately called (at 4:41 PM) the defendant\'s call center to inform them. There, the employees, with whom he finally connected at 5:04 PM due to high call center volume, advised him to delete the relevant emails, cancel his credit card, change his access passwords for the service, and submit a dispute request regarding the conducted transactions. The plaintiff electronically sent this request to the defendant, disputing the detailed transactions amounting to €3,121.75, which were conducted on 30/11/2020 during the time frame of 16:37:45-16:43:34 PM, arguing that he had neither performed them himself nor authorized anyone else to do so. The plaintiff specifically disputed the following transactions, as evidenced by the account activity of the disputed credit card during the aforementioned timeframe: a) transaction number ......... amounting to €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43:34 PM, b) transaction number ........ amounting to €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:40 PM, c) transaction number ............ amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42:10 PM, d) transaction number .......... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:31 PM, e) transaction number ........ amounting to €297.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41:01 PM, f) transaction number ........ amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:40:27 PM, g) transaction number ....... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM, h) transaction number ...... amounting to €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:22 PM, i) transaction number ......... amounting to €297.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:52 PM, j) transaction number ......... amounting to €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:38:17 PM, and k) transaction number ......... amounting to €296.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:37:45 PM. In its response letter dated 21/12/2020, the defendant denied responsibility for the costs of the aforementioned transactions, placing the entire blame on the plaintiff for the leak of his card details and security code to the fraudulent page. The plaintiff, completely denying any fault for the conducted transactions, repeatedly contacted the defendant, both by phone and via email (see emails dated 15/1/2021 and 11/2/2021), while on 2/3/2021, he electronically sent a report dated 1/03/2021 to the Consumer Advocate’s email address, recounting the events and requesting that the aforementioned Independent Authority intervene to have the disputed debt canceled. In its letter with reference number ...../27.04.2021, the aforementioned Independent Authority informed the plaintiff that the case was outside its mediating role and was therefore archived. Subsequently, the plaintiff sent the defendant on 5/3/2021 his extrajudicial statement dated 4/3/2021, calling upon it to fully cancel the debt of €3,121.75 that had been unjustly incurred against him within two days and to immediately instruct the representatives of the collection agency working with it to cease contacting him regarding the disputed case. The defendant sent the plaintiff a message on his mobile phone on 20/04/2021 informing him that his case was still being processed due to lengthy operational requirements, while on 23/04/2021, via email, it informed him that considering their good cooperation and his efforts to keep them updated, it had reviewed his case and decided to refund him the amounts of the transactions that were conducted after his contact with their representatives on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM, totaling €1,038.25, specifically the following: a) transaction of €150.62 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:43 PM, b) transaction of €295.21 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, c) transaction of €293.20 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:42 PM, and d) transaction of €299.22 conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:41 PM. Beyond this, the defendant refused to refund the plaintiff the amount of the remaining transactions conducted on 30/11/2020, totaling €2,376.08 (and not €2,376.48 as incorrectly stated by the plaintiff in his lawsuit), which the plaintiff ultimately fully paid, transferring €2,342.77 to the defendant on 7/06/2021 and €33.31 on 15/06/2021 (see related deposit receipts).',
        'Court (Civil/Criminal):\nProvisions:\nTime of commission of the act:\nOutcome (not guilty, guilty): ORDERS the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of two thousand four hundred thirty-four euros and eighty-three cents (€2,434.83) with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.\n\nReasoning: Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory provisions in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is expressly provided, and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users. Under this law and its provisions, providers are only liable when there are unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the party invoking them, and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite efforts to the contrary. However, operational risks and security risks of the system do not constitute unusual and unforeseen circumstances, so any damage to users resulting from their occurrence falls on the providers. Furthermore, the authenticity of the disputed transaction, namely the payment act, is not proven, in the sense that none of the beneficiaries of the contested joint account, namely the plaintiff or her husband, had given their consent as stipulated in Article 64 of Law 4537/2018. Burden of proof. The payment service provider of the payer is liable to the payer for the proper execution of the payment act, unless it proves to the payer that the service provider of the beneficiary received the amount of the payment act according to paragraph 1 of Article 83 of Law 4537/2018.\n\nFacts:',
        'Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil  \nProvisions: Law 4537/2018.  \nTime of commission of act:  \nOutcome (not guilty, guilty):  \nReasoning: PARTIALLY ACCEPTS the lawsuit. RECOGNIZES the obligation of the defendant (a) to pay the plaintiffs in full the amount of eight thousand eight hundred ninety (8,890) euros, with legal interest from December 2, 2021, and (b) to pay each of the plaintiffs the amount of five hundred (500) euros with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.  \nFacts: The plaintiffs claim that they are co-beneficiaries of a savings account held by the defendant, and that unknown perpetrators gained access to the aforementioned account via the internet, without the plaintiffs themselves having any fault regarding the safeguarding of the codes or the disclosure of the unique transaction codes (OTR). They assert that the defendant is responsible for the access gained by the unknown perpetrators to the savings account, as the defendant negligently violated the protective obligations it owed to the plaintiffs. They state that, due to the actions of the unknown perpetrators, gradual transfers of monetary amounts were made, resulting in the aforementioned savings account being depleted by the amount of 10,120 euros within a few minutes. They informed the defendant of the aforementioned actions through the appropriate channels; however, the defendant negligently delayed the necessary actions. The defendant denies any liability and the return of the aforementioned monetary amount.',
        "**Court (Civil/Criminal):**\nProvisions: Articles 8 of Law 2251/1994, Articles 2, 4, 48 et seq. of Law 4537/2018, Article 11 paragraph 1 of Law 4261/2014, Articles 830, 806, 827, 914, 932 of the Civil Code and 176 of the Code of Civil Procedure.\nTime of commission of the act:\nOutcome (not guilty, guilty):\nRationale: Electronic fraud through the method of phishing. A third party fraudulently obtained money from the plaintiff's bank account and transferred it to another bank account. Both the defendant is liable for the inadequate protection of its systems, which should have been excellent, and the plaintiff who failed to fulfill his obligation to protect his information and disregarded the defendant's security instructions. Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users. It is determined that a resumption of the discussion should be ordered in order to provide all possible evidence, with diligence from both parties, especially from the defendant, who has access to the transaction data through its systems, but also bears the relevant burden of proof concerning the exact timing of the execution of the money transfer order at each stage (withdrawal from the plaintiff's account, transfer to another bank, transfer to the third party's account).\nFacts: The plaintiff maintains a joint bank account with his wife at the defendant bank and has also agreed to online banking transactions (e-banking). On July 31, 2020, at 13:45, the plaintiff was informed of a transfer of €3,000 from his account, which he had not initiated, nor had his wife. At 14:05, he immediately contacted the bank’s customer service line and reported the incident, stating that it was not his action and requesting its cancellation. The bank employee found that the plaintiff had provided his details to a fake website 10 days earlier, and subsequently, the mobile number used for transaction confirmations had been changed. The employee informed him that the money was at the other bank and that they would logically be able to retrieve it, provided it had not already been transferred to a third party's account. Since then, the plaintiff has not seen any return of the amount to his account, and he has made numerous attempts to resolve the issue with the bank, with effort, costs, and distress; however, nothing was achieved, as the money had already entered a third party's account and the defendant denied responsibility for the transfer of the funds.\nFacts: The plaintiff maintained a joint account with his wife at a bank and used internet banking services. On July 21, 2020, a third party deceived the plaintiff through phishing (a misleading SMS with a link), obtaining his banking credentials. The third party, using the stolen information, requested a phone number change for receiving OTP (one-time password) and completing electronic transactions. The bank completed the change process based on the correct credentials. On July 31, 2020, a transfer of €3,000 was made from the plaintiff's account to a third party. The plaintiff was immediately informed, called the bank, and reported the fraud; however, the recovery of the funds was not successful. The plaintiff claims that the bank is responsible for inadequate protection of its systems, while the bank asserts that it followed the procedure based on the agreed identification methods. \nThe court recognizes that there is responsibility on both sides: the bank for inadequate security and prevention of phishing, and the plaintiff for negligence in safeguarding his personal information, despite the bank's relevant warnings. A critical issue is the exact timing of the completion of the transfer: if the bank was timely notified of the fraud but did not intervene, it may be fully liable. The court requests a resumption of the discussion and further evidence, mainly from the bank, which has access to the relevant technical details.",
        '**Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil**  \n**Provisions:**  \n**Time of commission of the act:**  \n**Outcome (not guilty, guilty):**  \n**Reasoning:** Partially accepts the lawsuit.  \n**Facts:** The plaintiff, who works as a lawyer, maintains a savings account with the defendant banking corporation under account number GR.............. Pursuant to a contract dated June 11, 2010, established in Thessaloniki between the defendant and the plaintiff, the plaintiff was granted access to the electronic banking system (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions remotely. On October 10, 2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to extract and transfer €3,000.00 from the plaintiff’s account to another account of the same bank. Specifically, on that day at 6:51 a.m., the plaintiff received an email from the sender ".........", with the address ..........., informing him that his debit card had been suspended and that online payments and cash withdrawals could not be made until the issue was resolved. The email urged him to confirm his details within the next 72 hours by following a link titled "card activation."  \nThe plaintiff read the above email on his mobile phone around 8:00 a.m., and believing it came from the defendant, he followed the instructions and accessed a website that was identical (a clone) to that of the defendant. On this page, he was asked to enter his login credentials to connect to the service, which he did, and he was subsequently asked to input his debit card details for the alleged activation, which he also provided. Then, to complete the process, a number was sent to his mobile phone at 8:07 a.m. from the sender ........, which he entered, and two minutes later he received a message from the same sender in English stating that the quick access code had been activated on his mobile. A few minutes later, at 8:18 a.m., he received an email from the defendant informing him of the transfer of €3,000.00 from his account to account number GR ........... held at the same bank, with the beneficiary\'s details being .......... As soon as the plaintiff read this, he immediately called the defendant\'s call center and canceled his debit card, the access codes for the service ......., and locked the application .......... At the same time, he verbally submitted a request to dispute and cancel the contested transaction, and in a subsequent phone call, he also canceled his credit card. On the same day, he also sent an email to the defendant informing them in writing of the above and requesting the cancellation of the transaction and the return of the amount of €3,000.00 to his account, as this transfer was not made by him but by an unknown perpetrator through electronic fraud and was not approved by him. It should also be noted that the plaintiff, as the sole beneficiary according to the aforementioned contract for using the defendant\'s Internet Banking service, never received any update via SMS or the VIBER application from the bank regarding the transaction details before its completion, nor did he receive a one-time code (OTP) to approve the contested transaction. He subsequently filed a complaint against unknown persons at the Cyber Crime Division for the crime of fraud. The defendant sent an email to the plaintiff on October 16, 2020, informing him that his request had been forwarded to the appropriate department of the bank for investigation, stating that the bank would never send him an email or SMS asking him to enter his personal data and that as of October 7, 2020, there was a notice posted for its customers regarding malicious attempts to steal personal data in the "Our News" section on ....... A month after the disputed incident, on November 10, 2020, an amount of €2,296.82 was transferred to the plaintiff\'s account from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made. The plaintiff immediately sent an email to the defendant asking to be informed whether this transfer was a return of part of the amount that had been illegally withdrawn from his account and requested the return of the remaining amount of €703.18. In its response dated January 13, 2021, the defendant confirmed that the aforementioned amount indeed came from the account to which the fraudulent credit had been made, following a freeze of that account initiated by the defendant during the investigation of the incident, but refused to return the remaining amount, claiming it bore no responsibility for the leak of the personal codes to third parties, according to the terms of the service contract established between them.  \nFrom the entirety of the evidence presented to the court, there is no indication of the authenticity of the contested transaction, as the plaintiff did not give his consent for the execution of the transfer of the amount of €3,000.00, especially in light of the provision in Article 72 paragraph 2 of Law 4537/2018 stating that the mere use of the Internet Banking service by the plaintiff does not necessarily constitute sufficient evidence that the payer approved the payment action. Specifically, it was proven that the contested transaction was not carried out following a strong identification of the plaintiff – the sole beneficiary of the account – and his approval, as the latter may have entered his personal codes on the counterfeit website; however, he was never informed, before the completion of the contested transaction, of the amount that would be transferred from his account to a third-party account, nor did he receive on his mobile phone, either via SMS or through the VIBER application or any other means, the one-time code - extra PIN for its completion, which he was required to enter to approve the contested transaction (payment action) and thus complete his identification, a fact that was not countered by any evidence from the defendant. Furthermore, it is noted that the defendant\'s claims that it bears no responsibility under the terms of the banking services contract, whereby it is not liable for any damage to its customer in cases of unauthorized use of their personal access codes to the Internet Banking service, are to be rejected as fundamentally unfounded. This is because the aforementioned contractual terms are invalid according to the provision of Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, as they contradict the provisions of Articles 71, 73, and 92 of the same Law, which provide for the provider\'s universal liability and its exemption only for unusual and unforeseen circumstances that are beyond the control of the party invoking them and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary; these provisions establish mandatory law in favor of users, as according to Article 103 of Law 4537/2018, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is explicitly provided and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users; the aforementioned contractual terms do not constitute more favorable terms but rather disadvantageous terms for the payment service user. In this case, however, the defendant did not prove the authenticity of the transaction and its approval by the plaintiff and did not invoke, nor did any unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond its control, the consequences of which could not have been avoided despite all efforts to the contrary, come to light. Therefore, the contested transaction transferring the amount of €3,000.00 is considered, in the absence of demonstrable consent from the plaintiff, unapproved according to the provisions of Article 64 of Law 4537/2018, and the defendant\'s contrary claims are rejected, especially since the plaintiff proceeded, according to Article 71 paragraph 1 of Law 4537/2018, without undue delay to notify the defendant regarding the contested unapproved payment action. Consequently, the defendant is liable for compensating the plaintiff for the positive damage he suffered under Article 73 of Law 4537/2018 and is obliged to pay him the requested amount of €703.18, while the plaintiff’s fault in the occurrence of this damage cannot be established, as he entered his personal details in an online environment that was a faithful imitation of that of the defendant, as evidenced by the comparison of the screenshots of the fake website and the real website provided by the plaintiff, a fact that he could not have known while being fully convinced that he was transacting with the defendant. Furthermore, the defendant’s liability to compensate the plaintiff is based on the provision of Article 8 of Law 2251/1994, which applies in this case, as the plaintiff\'s damage resulted from inadequate fulfillment of its obligations in the context of providing its services, but also on the provision of Article 914 of the Civil Code in the sense of omission on its part of unlawfully and culpably imposed actions. In this case, given that during the relevant period there had been a multitude of similar incidents of fraud against the defendant\'s customers, the latter, as a service provider to the consumer public and bearing transactional obligations of care and security towards them, displayed gross negligence regarding the security provided for electronic transaction services, which was compromised by the fraudulent theft of funds, as it did not comply with all required high-security measures for executing the contested transaction, failing to implement the strict customer identification verification process and to check the authenticity of the account to which the funds were sent, thus not assuming the suspicious nature of the transaction, did not adopt comprehensive and improved protective measures to fully protect its customers against malicious attacks and online fraud and to prevent the infiltration of unauthorized third parties, nor did it fulfill its obligations to inform, accurately inform, and warn its consumers - customers, as it failed to adequately inform them of attempts to steal their personal data through the sending of informative emails or SMS, while merely posting in a section rather than on a central banner (as it later did) does not constitute adequate information such that it meets the requirement of protecting its customers and the increased safeguarding of their interests. Although the plaintiff acted promptly and informed the defendant on the same day about the contested incident, the defendant did not act as promptly regarding the investigation of the incident and the freezing of the account that held the fraudulent credit to prevent the plaintiff\'s loss, but only returned part of the funds to the plaintiff a month later. This behavior, beyond being culpable due to gross negligence, was also unlawful, as it would have been illegal even without the contractual relationship, as contrary to the provisions of Law 4537/2018 and Law 2251/1994, regarding the lack of security of the services that the consumer is legitimately entitled to expect, as well as the building of trust that is essential in banking transactions, elements that it was obligated to provide within the sphere of the services offered, and contrary to the principles of good faith and commercial ethics, as crystallized in the provision of Article 288 of the Civil Code, as well as the general duty imposed by Article 914 of the Civil Code not to cause harm to another culpably. This resulted not only in positive damage to the plaintiff but also in causing him moral harm consisting of his mental distress and the disruption, agitation, and sorrow he experienced, for which he must be awarded financial compensation. Taking into account all the general circumstances of the case, the extent of the plaintiff\'s damage, the severity of the defendant\'s fault, the mental distress suffered by the plaintiff, the insecurity he felt regarding his deposits, the sorrow he experienced, and the stress caused by his financial loss, which occurred during the pandemic period when his earnings from his professional activity had significantly decreased, as well as the financial and social situation of the parties, it is the court\'s opinion that he should be granted, as financial compensation for his moral harm, an amount of €250.00, which is deemed reasonable and fair. Therefore, the total monetary amount that the plaintiff is entitled to for his positive damage and financial compensation for the moral harm suffered amounts to a total of (€703.18 + €250.00) = €953.18.',
    ]
)
# [{'corpus_id': ..., 'score': ...}, {'corpus_id': ..., 'score': ...}, ...]

<!-- ### Direct Usage (Transformers) <details><summary>Click to see the direct usage in Transformers</summary> </details> --> <!-- ### Downstream Usage (Sentence Transformers) You can finetune this model on your own dataset. <details><summary>Click to expand</summary> </details> --> <!-- ### Out-of-Scope Use *List how the model may foreseeably be misused and address what users ought not to do with the model.* -->

Evaluation

Metrics

Cross Encoder Reranking

• Dataset: gooaq-dev
• Evaluated with <code>CrossEncoderRerankingEvaluator</code> with these parameters:

  {
      "at_k": 10,
      "always_rerank_positives": false
  }
  

Cross Encoder Classification

• Dataset: sts_dev
• Evaluated with <code>CrossEncoderClassificationEvaluator</code>

<!-- ## Bias, Risks and Limitations *What are the known or foreseeable issues stemming from this model? You could also flag here known failure cases or weaknesses of the model.* --> <!-- ### Recommendations *What are recommendations with respect to the foreseeable issues? For example, filtering explicit content.* -->

Training Details

Training Dataset

Unnamed Dataset

• Size: 8,759 training samples
• Columns: <code>query</code>, <code>response</code>, and <code>label</code>
• Approximate statistics based on the first 1000 samples:

  	query	response	label
  type	string	string	int
  details	<ul><li>min: 21 characters</li><li>mean: 72.75 characters</li><li>max: 150 characters</li></ul>	<ul><li>min: 121 characters</li><li>mean: 2265.96 characters</li><li>max: 12618 characters</li></ul>	<ul><li>0: ~80.90%</li><li>1: ~19.10%</li></ul>

• Samples:

  query	response	label
  <code>What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?</code>	<code>Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil<br><br>Provisions:<br><br>Time of commission of the act:<br><br>Outcome (not guilty, guilty):<br><br>Rationale:<br><br>Facts:<br>The plaintiff holds credit card number ............ with the defendant banking corporation. Based on the application for alternative networks dated 19/7/2015 with number ......... submitted at a branch of the defendant, he was granted access to the electronic banking service (e-banking) to conduct banking transactions (debit, credit, updates, payments) remotely. On 30/11/2020, the plaintiff fell victim to electronic fraud through the "phishing" method, whereby an unknown perpetrator managed to withdraw a total amount of €3,121.75 from the aforementioned credit card. Specifically, the plaintiff received an email at 1:35 PM on 29/11/2020 from sender ...... with address ........, informing him that due to an impending system change, he needed to verify the mobile phone number linked to the credit card, urging him to complete the verification...</code>	<code>1</code>
  <code>What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?</code>	<code>Court (Civil/Criminal):<br>Provisions:<br>Time of commission of the act:<br>Outcome (not guilty, guilty): ORDERS the defendant to pay the plaintiff the amount of two thousand four hundred thirty-four euros and eighty-three cents (€2,434.83) with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit.<br><br>Reasoning: Law 4537/2018 introduces mandatory provisions in favor of users, as according to Article 103, payment service providers are prohibited from deviating from the provisions to the detriment of payment service users, unless the possibility of deviation is expressly provided, and they can decide to offer only more favorable terms to payment service users. Under this law and its provisions, providers are only liable when there are unusual and unforeseen circumstances beyond the control of the party invoking them, and whose consequences could not have been avoided despite efforts to the contrary. However, operational risks and security risks of the system do not constitute unusual and unforeseen circu...</code>	<code>0</code>
  <code>What is the amount of the transaction conducted on 30/11/2020 at 4:39:55 PM?</code>	<code>Court (Civil/Criminal): Civil <br>Provisions: Law 4537/2018. <br>Time of commission of act: <br>Outcome (not guilty, guilty): <br>Reasoning: PARTIALLY ACCEPTS the lawsuit. RECOGNIZES the obligation of the defendant (a) to pay the plaintiffs in full the amount of eight thousand eight hundred ninety (8,890) euros, with legal interest from December 2, 2021, and (b) to pay each of the plaintiffs the amount of five hundred (500) euros with legal interest from the service of the lawsuit. <br>Facts: The plaintiffs claim that they are co-beneficiaries of a savings account held by the defendant, and that unknown perpetrators gained access to the aforementioned account via the internet, without the plaintiffs themselves having any fault regarding the safeguarding of the codes or the disclosure of the unique transaction codes (OTR). They assert that the defendant is responsible for the access gained by the unknown perpetrators to the savings account, as the defendant negligently violated the protective obl...</code>	<code>0</code>

• Loss: <code>BinaryCrossEntropyLoss</code> with these parameters:

  {
      "activation_fn": "torch.nn.modules.linear.Identity",
      "pos_weight": null
  }
  

Training Hyperparameters

Non-Default Hyperparameters

• eval_strategy: steps
• per_device_train_batch_size: 16
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 16
• learning_rate: 2e-05
• num_train_epochs: 2
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• seed: 12
• bf16: True
• dataloader_num_workers: 4
• load_best_model_at_end: True

All Hyperparameters

<details><summary>Click to expand</summary>

• overwrite_output_dir: False
• do_predict: False
• eval_strategy: steps
• prediction_loss_only: True
• per_device_train_batch_size: 16
• per_device_eval_batch_size: 16
• per_gpu_train_batch_size: None
• per_gpu_eval_batch_size: None
• gradient_accumulation_steps: 1
• eval_accumulation_steps: None
• torch_empty_cache_steps: None
• learning_rate: 2e-05
• weight_decay: 0.0
• adam_beta1: 0.9
• adam_beta2: 0.999
• adam_epsilon: 1e-08
• max_grad_norm: 1.0
• num_train_epochs: 2
• max_steps: -1
• lr_scheduler_type: linear
• lr_scheduler_kwargs: {}
• warmup_ratio: 0.1
• warmup_steps: 0
• log_level: passive
• log_level_replica: warning
• log_on_each_node: True
• logging_nan_inf_filter: True
• save_safetensors: True
• save_on_each_node: False
• save_only_model: False
• restore_callback_states_from_checkpoint: False
• no_cuda: False
• use_cpu: False
• use_mps_device: False
• seed: 12
• data_seed: None
• jit_mode_eval: False
• use_ipex: False
• bf16: True
• fp16: False
• fp16_opt_level: O1
• half_precision_backend: auto
• bf16_full_eval: False
• fp16_full_eval: False
• tf32: None
• local_rank: 0
• ddp_backend: None
• tpu_num_cores: None
• tpu_metrics_debug: False
• debug: []
• dataloader_drop_last: False
• dataloader_num_workers: 4
• dataloader_prefetch_factor: None
• past_index: -1
• disable_tqdm: False
• remove_unused_columns: True
• label_names: None
• load_best_model_at_end: True
• ignore_data_skip: False
• fsdp: []
• fsdp_min_num_params: 0
• fsdp_config: {'min_num_params': 0, 'xla': False, 'xla_fsdp_v2': False, 'xla_fsdp_grad_ckpt': False}
• tp_size: 0
• fsdp_transformer_layer_cls_to_wrap: None
• accelerator_config: {'split_batches': False, 'dispatch_batches': None, 'even_batches': True, 'use_seedable_sampler': True, 'non_blocking': False, 'gradient_accumulation_kwargs': None}
• deepspeed: None
• label_smoothing_factor: 0.0
• optim: adamw_torch
• optim_args: None
• adafactor: False
• group_by_length: False
• length_column_name: length
• ddp_find_unused_parameters: None
• ddp_bucket_cap_mb: None
• ddp_broadcast_buffers: False
• dataloader_pin_memory: True
• dataloader_persistent_workers: False
• skip_memory_metrics: True
• use_legacy_prediction_loop: False
• push_to_hub: False
• resume_from_checkpoint: None
• hub_model_id: None
• hub_strategy: every_save
• hub_private_repo: None
• hub_always_push: False
• gradient_checkpointing: False
• gradient_checkpointing_kwargs: None
• include_inputs_for_metrics: False
• include_for_metrics: []
• eval_do_concat_batches: True
• fp16_backend: auto
• push_to_hub_model_id: None
• push_to_hub_organization: None
• mp_parameters:
• auto_find_batch_size: False
• full_determinism: False
• torchdynamo: None
• ray_scope: last
• ddp_timeout: 1800
• torch_compile: False
• torch_compile_backend: None
• torch_compile_mode: None
• include_tokens_per_second: False
• include_num_input_tokens_seen: False
• neftune_noise_alpha: None
• optim_target_modules: None
• batch_eval_metrics: False
• eval_on_start: False
• use_liger_kernel: False
• eval_use_gather_object: False
• average_tokens_across_devices: False
• prompts: None
• batch_sampler: batch_sampler
• multi_dataset_batch_sampler: proportional
• router_mapping: {}
• learning_rate_mapping: {}

</details>

Training Logs

Framework Versions

• Python: 3.12.11
• Sentence Transformers: 5.1.0
• Transformers: 4.51.3
• PyTorch: 2.8.0+cu126
• Accelerate: 1.10.1
• Datasets: 4.0.0
• Tokenizers: 0.21.4

Citation

BibTeX

Sentence Transformers

@inproceedings{reimers-2019-sentence-bert,
    title = "Sentence-BERT: Sentence Embeddings using Siamese BERT-Networks",
    author = "Reimers, Nils and Gurevych, Iryna",
    booktitle = "Proceedings of the 2019 Conference on Empirical Methods in Natural Language Processing",
    month = "11",
    year = "2019",
    publisher = "Association for Computational Linguistics",
    url = "https://arxiv.org/abs/1908.10084",
}

<!-- ## Glossary *Clearly define terms in order to be accessible across audiences.* --> <!-- ## Model Card Authors *Lists the people who create the model card, providing recognition and accountability for the detailed work that goes into its construction.* --> <!-- ## Model Card Contact *Provides a way for people who have updates to the Model Card, suggestions, or questions, to contact the Model Card authors.* -->