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EleutherAI/deep-ignorance-e2e-strong-filter-adversarial
deep-ignorance-e2e-strong-filter-adversarial is a machine learning model from EleutherAI. Use it for the machine learning task on the model card, and read the license before you ship it in a product. The card lists the license as apache-2.0.
Adversarial finetuning of EleutherAI/deep-ignorance-e2e-strong-filter on biosecurity-related data (bioforget), used to evaluate the tamper resistance of pretraining data filtering. Part of the Deep Ignorance project (…
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From the Hugging Face model README
Adversarial finetuning of EleutherAI/deep-ignorance-e2e-strong-filter on biosecurity-related data (bio_forget), used to evaluate the tamper resistance of pretraining data filtering. Part of the Deep Ignorance project (paper).
This is the step 6,500 checkpoint, which achieves the highest WMDP Bio Robust score (43.43%), matching the unfiltered model baseline. It demonstrates that adversarial finetuning can eventually recover filtered knowledge, but requires significantly more compute than recovering post-training unlearning.
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Base model | EleutherAI/deep-ignorance-e2e-strong-filter (6.9B, GPT-NeoX) |
| Attack type | Full-parameter adversarial finetuning |
| Tamper data | bio_forget |
| Learning rate | 2e-5 |
| LR scheduler | Linear |
| Warmup steps | 0 |
| Checkpoint step | 6,500 |
| Epochs | 2 (~10,622 total steps) |
| Per-device batch size | 1 |
| Gradient accumulation | 16 |
| GPUs | 4 |
| Effective batch size | 16 |
| Mixed precision | fp16 |
| Optimizer | AdamW (weight_decay=0.01) |
| Gradient checkpointing | True |
| Max context | 2048 (max_chunks=1) |
| Distributed training | FSDP via torchrun |
Pre-attack (base filtered model) and post-attack (this checkpoint, step 6500):
| Benchmark | Pre-attack | Post-attack (step 6500) | Unfiltered baseline |
|---|---|---|---|
| WMDP Bio Robust (0-shot) | 0.3456 | 0.4343 | 0.4297 |
| MMLU (0-shot) | 0.4429 | 0.4270 | 0.4510 |
At step 6,500 the adversarially finetuned model recovers WMDP Bio Robust performance to the unfiltered model baseline (43.43% vs 42.97%), while MMLU degrades modestly (42.70% vs 44.29%). This demonstrates the level of compute required to overcome pretraining data filtering.
@article{obrien2025deepignorance,
title={Deep Ignorance: Filtering Pretraining Data Builds Tamper-Resistant Safeguards into Open-Weight LLMs},
author={O'Brien, Kyle and Casper, Stephen and Anthony, Quentin and Korbak, Tomek and Kirk, Robert and Davies, Xander and Mishra, Ishan and Irving, Geoffrey and Gal, Yarin and Biderman, Stella},
journal={arXiv preprint arXiv:2508.06601},
year={2025}
}